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ADULT SUPERVISION REQUIRED: THE 
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS’S 
RECKLESS ADVENTURES WITH 
AFFORDABLE HOUSING AND THE  
ANTI-SNOB ZONING ACT 
Jonathan Witten* 
Abstract: Recognizing that municipalities are inherently selfish and that 
they would intentionally exclude certain land uses and structures, the ma-
jority of states have required that their cities and towns plan for and ac-
commodate undesirable land uses within their borders. The planned in-
corporation of undesirable and desirable land uses is a fundamental 
attribute of states that require and enforce the preparation of coordi-
nated and rationally developed comprehensive plans. This Article dis-
cusses the approach taken in Massachusetts—a non plan state—and its 
myopic and regressive mechanism for compelling the construction of af-
fordable housing. The Article suggests that the Massachusetts example is 
a failure of law and policy and that the statute, both abusive and abused, 
must be repealed. In its stead, Massachusetts must look to the success of 
numerous other states that have incorporated the development of afford-
able housing—and other land uses—within a rationally developed, and 
legally meaningful, comprehensive plan. 
Introduction 
 The use of zoning as a form of land-use control dates back to Na-
poleon1 and, in the United States, to Boston’s efforts to impose build-
ing height restrictions within established “districts.”2 Zoning has been 
sanctioned as a legitimate police power by the U.S. Supreme Court on 
countless occasions3 and in each of the fifty states.4 Relentlessly criti-
                                                                                                                      
* Partner, Daley and Witten, LLC; Adjunct Professor, Boston College Law School; Lec-
turer, Tufts University Department of Urban and Environmental Policy and Planning; 
Member, American Institute of Certified Planners. 
1 James Metzenbaum, The Law of Zoning 12–13 (2d ed. 1955). 
2 Welch v. Swasey, 214 U.S. 91, 108 (1909) (upholding Boston’s differing height re-
strictions and classification of districts). 
3 See, e.g., Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 591 (1962); Village of Euclid 
v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 373 (1926). 
4 Daniel R. Mandelker et al., Planning and Control of Land Development: 
Cases and Materials 212 (6th ed. 2005). 
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cized as exclusionary,5 and so confusing that it must be “written by 
Abbott and Costello,”6 zoning remains the most common form of 
land-use regulation in the nation and is relied upon by every major 
city and by the majority of cities and towns throughout the country.7 
 A bedrock principle of zoning is that it is locally adopted and ad-
ministered.8 Counties, cities, and towns adopt and enforce zoning, not 
the respective states nor the federal government.9 Zoning is myopic in 
practice—it looks neither to regional needs nor statewide concerns. 
Rather, zoning considers only those land-use goals articulated by the 
legislative body of the local government.10 
 Long ago, state legislatures recognized that, if left alone, municipal 
governments would ignore the concerns of their neighboring commu-
nities and, most notably, fail to accept what was later termed as each 
municipality’s “fair share”11 of undesirable land uses. 
 Locally undesirable land uses include those that are undesirable 
from a neighborhood perspective, such as landfills and airports.12 But 
undesirable land uses also include those that are anticipated to be 
                                                                                                                      
5 See James C. Clingermayer, Heresthetics and Happenstance: Intentional and Unintentional 
Exclusionary Impacts of the Zoning Decision-making Process, 41 Urb. Stud. 377, 378 (2004) (“In 
a very real and obvious sense, all zoning is exclusionary, for it prohibits certain kinds of 
activities or structures in certain places.”). See generally Norman Williams, Jr. & Thomas 
Norman, Exclusionary Land Use Controls: The Case of North-Eastern New Jersey, 22 Syracuse L. 
Rev. 475 (1971) (providing a land-use and economic analysis of the exclusionary zoning 
problem). 
6 See Alan Ehrenhalt, The Trouble with Zoning, Governing, Feb. 1998, at 28 (referring 
to the complexities of the Minneapolis Zoning Ordinance). 
7 The City of Houston remains the only major city in the United States without a for-
mal zoning code. Kris Hudson, Houston’s Twilight Zone: Projects Rise in Odd Spots, Wall St. 
J., Oct. 17, 2007, at B1. 
8 See generally Advisory Comm. on Zoning, U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, A Standard 
State Zoning Enabling Act: Under Which Municipalities May Adopt Zoning Regula-
tions (1926), available at http://www.planning.org/growingsmart/pdf/SZEnabling Act1926. 
pdf (providing a sample act that states could adopt to enable cities and municipalities to 
zone). 
9 See id. at 4–5. 
10 See id. 
11 See Vicki Been, What’s Fairness Got to Do With It? Environmental Justice and the Siting of 
Locally Undesirable Land Uses, 78 Cornell L. Rev. 1001, 1005 (1993) (describing New York 
City’s “fair share” criterion that each borough “bear its fair share of undesirable land 
uses”). 
12 See Am. Planning Ass’n, Growing Smart Legislative Guidebook: Model Stat-
utes for the Management of Change 5-6 to -7 (Stuart Meck ed., 2002) (identifying 
categories of Locally Undesirable Land Uses (LULUs) and Not in My Backyards (NIMBYs) 
as including airports, landfills, prisons, group homes, and solid waste facilities, among 
others). Below-market-rate housing and rental housing developments are not listed as 
LULUs or NIMBYs. See id. 
2008] Revising Massachusetts's Affordable Housing and Anti-Snob Zoning 219 
deemed undesirable. In this instance, it is the state legislature that an-
ticipates municipal opposition. 
 The result of this reality—that local governments are inherently 
selfish—is that the state preempts13 or marginalizes14 predicted neighbor-
hood opposition. The preemption efforts in many states have been ex-
ceedingly progressive. These states have concluded that while these 
plans and regulatory requirements must incorporate issues of statewide 
and regional concerns, local governments know best how to plan for 
and regulate their respective land uses. These states are so-called “plan 
states” and are characterized as states that require their cities and towns 
to adopt meaningful and enforceable plans pursuant to articulated re-
quirements established by the state legislature.15 While the city or town 
has significant latitude in how the plans are developed, enforced, and 
revised, the planning requirements nonetheless force the city or town to 
incorporate a fair share of defined undesirable uses.16 
                                                                                                                      
13 Examples of preemptive efforts are found throughout the nation and are character-
ized by the state’s reliance on the supremacy clause found within every state constitution. 
As “creatures” of the state, local governments are subject to the give and take of police 
powers. See City of Trenton v. New Jersey, 262 U.S. 182, 189–90 (1923). The U.S. Supreme 
Court noted: 
A municipal corporation is simply a political subdivision of the State, and ex-
ists by virtue of the exercise of the power of the State through its legislative 
department. The legislature could at any time terminate the existence of the 
corporation itself, and provide other and different means for the government 
of the district comprised within the limits of the former city. The city is the 
creature of the State. 
Id.; see also Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 179 (1907) (“In all these respects the 
State is supreme . . . .”). 
14 See Been, supra note 11, at 1048–49. Been argues, in relevant part, that the environ-
mental justice movement seeks equity with regard to the placement of undesirable land 
uses and, as such, can be considered to be arguing against the flip side of past practices of 
cities and towns to restrict beneficial municipal services to only wealthy areas of the com-
munity. In both cases—the siting of undesirable land uses in disproportionately poor 
neighborhoods and the intentional withholding of public services and public benefits to 
poor neighborhoods—the state has played a key role. In the former example, the state has 
barred local governments from prohibiting or regulating the particular land use. In the 
latter example, the state has allowed local governments to expand municipal infrastruc-
ture without regard to a rational plan. Id. at 1002–05, 1015–16. 
15 E.g., Daniel J. Curtin, Jr. & Jonathan D. Witten, Windfalls, Wipeouts, Givings, and Tak-
ings in Dramatic Redevelopment Projects: Bargaining for Better Zoning on Density, Views, and Public 
Access, 32 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 325, 328–29 (2005). 
16 See Daniel J. Curtin, Jr., Ramapo’s Impact on the Comprehensive Plan, 35 Urb. Law. 135, 
135–36 (2003); Curtin & Witten, supra note 15, at 328–30; Edward J. Sullivan & Matthew J. 
Michel, Ramapo Plus Thirty: The Changing Role of the Plan in Land Use Regulations, 35 Urb. 
Law. 75, 82–83 (2003). 
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 In other states, labeled as “non plan” states,17 state preemption 
efforts have been maddeningly regressive and dysfunctional. The ef-
forts are regressive because, while the state strips local governments of 
the ability to regulate in specified areas, the state provides no mecha-
nism for local governments to coordinate properly for—plan for—the 
very uses the state demands that cities and towns accommodate. 
 This Article explores the preemptive efforts employed by Massa-
chusetts, a decidedly non plan state,18 in the field of below-market-
rate—so-called affordable—housing development. The following dis-
cussion is an update of an earlier exposé of the Massachusetts afford-
able housing statute.19 
I. Preempting and Marginalizing Municipal Opposition to 
Undesirable Land Uses 
 Recognizing the likelihood of local opposition to certain land uses, 
states have routinely employed their preemptive powers either to block 
local opposition or to impose limitations on local powers. States have lit-
tle choice; some land uses are deemed of such statewide or regional im-
portance that any other response would allow local governments simply 
to preclude—impose barriers to20—these undesirable land uses. At issue 
is how best to employ these preemptive powers. One option is to impose 
land-use requirements by requiring the fulfillment of a comprehensive 
plan.21 For land uses that the state deems required, cities and towns have 
the opportunity to site these uses in accordance, and consistent, with the 
municipality’s plan. Another option—the one discussed in this Article— 
is for the state to strip local controls almost in their entirety, unless and 
until the municipality meets the state prescribed objective. 
 The difference between the two options is stark. In the former, cities 
and towns are allowed to plan best for the land uses that occur within 
their borders, while fulfilling the state’s mandate on a schedule, and in a 
manner, that suits both the ends—provision of mandated land uses—and 
the means—compliance with the locally adopted comprehensive plan. In 
                                                                                                                      
17 E.g., Curtin & Witten, supra note 15, at 328–30. 
18 Id. 
19 See generally Jonathan Douglas Witten, The Cost of Developing Affordable Housing: At 
What Price?, 30 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 509 (2003) (discussing the affordable housing 
crisis, specifically in Massachusetts). 
20 “Barriers” is a frequent descriptor of the application of zoning and other land-use 
controls used by affordable housing advocates. See, e.g., Regulatory Barriers Clearinghouse, 
http://www.huduser.org/rbc (last visited Mar. 27, 2008). 
21 Curtin & Witten, supra note 15, at 328–30. 
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the latter, planning is nonexistent; the state’s end goal trumps the me-
chanics of achieving it. 
 While this Article uses the Massachusetts affordable housing stat-
ute as an example of the wrong approach to creating affordable hous-
ing, or governance in general, a different example should prove help-
ful. First, imagine that a state, in order to fulfill the governor’s policy of 
improving public health and general environmental goals, required 
every city and town to preserve no less than twenty-five percent of its 
remaining undeveloped land as parks and open spaces. Cities and 
towns would be free to preserve open spaces and develop parks 
through a variety of regulatory and nonregulatory techniques.22 
 Every five years, the state’s department of environmental protec-
tion would publish a state open space inventory, as noted in Table 1.23 
Communities that met the open space minimums would be free to al-
low new residential and nonresidential development, subject to state 
zoning authority. However, cities and towns that had not met the open 
space minimums would be preempted from approving any new resi-
dential or nonresidential development not otherwise protected pursu-
ant to the vested rights24 provisions found in state law. In other words, 
noncompliance with the state-established minimum open space re-
quirements would suspend permit approval for new development. 
 Table 1: Example open space inventories 
 Community Total Municipal Land 
Area 
Qualifying Open 
Space 
Additional Open 
Space Required 
 City A 9 square miles 450 acres 990 acres 
 Town B 21 square miles 1320 acres 12,120 acres 
 
                                                                                                                      
22 Massachusetts cities and towns could fulfill the legislative mandate by requiring 
open space within standard (grid) subdivisions, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 41, § 81U (2006), 
and cluster subdivisions, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 40A, § 9 (2006), or through the expenditure 
of Community Preservation Act funds, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 44B (2006), bonding, borrow-
ing, or solicitation of donations. 
23 Table 1 is modeled after the Massachusetts Department of Housing and Community 
Development’s (DHCD) Chapter 40B Subsidized Housing Inventory, which contains a 
listing of the state’s 351 cities and towns and their status with respect to housing units that 
DHCD counts toward the community’s ten percent affordable housing quota. Department 
of Housing & Community Development, Chapter 40B Subsidized Housing Inventory (SHI) 
as of March 14, 2008, http://www.mass.gov/Ehed/docs/dhcd/hd/shi/shiinventory.htm 
[hereinafter SHI]. 
24 See Brad K. Schwartz, Note, Development Agreements: Contracting for Vested Rights, 28 
B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 719, 721–26 (2001) (providing a general discussion of vested 
rights in development decisions). The doctrine of vested rights is a principle of equitable 
estoppel—at some point, a developer has invested so much that the government should be 
estopped from changing the zoning regulations. Id. at 722. 
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 The result of this fictional statute would be chaos. Cities and towns 
would revolt, perhaps, arguing that the state’s directive of open space, 
while certainly well meaning, trumps local control, is the antithesis of 
planning, ignores the interconnectedness of municipal and regional 
land-use issues, and is singularly myopic. Such a statute would impose a 
one-size-fits-all policy for a diverse state and elevate one municipal gov-
ernance issue above and beyond all others. The statute would un-
doubtedly never pass and, if it did, would not likely survive. The flaw of 
the statute is not its intended objective—more open space—but rather 
the mechanism for achieving it—a draconian usurpation of local plan-
ning authority in an area where local planning authority is required. 
 Though the subject matter of this hypothetical statute—open 
space—is different, its shortcomings are identical to those of Massachu-
setts’ affordable housing statute, the intended subject matter of which 
is the creation of below-market-rate housing.25 
II. The Workings of the Massachusetts Anti-Snob Zoning Act: 
Anarchy in Motion 
 Adopted in 1969, the purported purpose of the Massachusetts 
Anti-Snob Zoning Act26 was to provide much-needed housing for re-
                                                                                                                      
25 See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 40B (2006). The Massachusetts comprehensive permit stat-
ute is a one-size-fits-all statute. It makes no distinction among the state’s unique geologic or 
topographic regions or among the state’s cities, suburbs, or relatively rural towns. That 
each and every community—both Boston and Lee, for instance—must attain the same 
standard is testimony to the drafters’ myopia and the Legislature’s continued unwilling-
ness to appreciate that Boston (population approximately 589,141) is different from Lee 
(population approximately 2021). See Boston, Massachusetts (MA) Detailed Profile, 
http://www.city-data.com/city/Boston-Massachusetts.html (last visited Mar. 27, 2008); Lee, 
Massachusetts (MA) Detailed Profile, http://www.city-data.com/city/Lee-Massachusetts. 
html (last visited Mar. 27, 2008). More disturbing, the statute presumes that Lee is, should, 
or will become, simply an expansion of urban growth from Boston westward. “The wilder-
ness, the isolated farm, the plantation, the self-contained New England town, the detached 
neighborhood are things of the American past. All the world’s a city now and there is no 
escaping urbanization, not even in outer space.” Morton White & Lucia White, The Ameri-
can Intellectual Versus the American City, in American Urban History: An Interpretive 
Reader With Commentaries 354–55 (Alexander B. Callow, Jr. ed., 1969). 
26 Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 40B (state comprehensive permit statute). Chapter 774 of the 
Acts of 1969 was referred to in the original house bill (5429) as the “Anti-Snob Zoning 
Act.” Act of Aug. 23, 1969, ch. 774, 1969 Mass. Acts 712. The statute is commonly referred 
to as the “Anti-Snob Zoning Act” by its supporters. See Eric Reenstierna, One Reason to Like 
Anti-Snob Zoning, Boston Globe, Aug. 13, 2007, at A11 (“With 40B, the state found a more 
creative solution. It changed the rules. The change left developers free to do what devel-
opers do—make a profit—and, in the process, solve the housing problem. The state ac-
complished that without spending a cent.”). 
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turning Vietnam veterans, and to break down the barriers erected by 
the suburbs to the construction of affordable sale and rental housing.27 
 Previous efforts have discussed in detail the workings of the statute, 
including interpretations of how the statute could or should work.28 
 In practice, the statute provides a developer with a blank check to 
build an unlimited number of dwelling units on a parcel of land zoned 
for a different use or for a density far different from that proposed. In-
creasing the value of the blank check given to developers, the Supreme 
Judicial Court of Massachusetts (SJC) recently concluded that a board 
of appeals is empowered to approve nonresidential uses and structures 
                                                                                                                      
27 Now codified as 760 Mass. Code Regs. 56.01 to 56.08, without reference to Vietnam 
veterans, the regulations state the goal of reducing “regulatory barriers that impede the 
development of such housing.” 760 Mass. Code Regs. 56.01 (2008). Much has been writ-
ten regarding the history of the statute and the curious timing of the adoption by the Leg-
islature—by a two vote majority—in the wake of Boston’s “forced busing” and the racial 
crises that followed. See Paul K. Stockman, Note, Anti-Snob Zoning in Massachusetts: Assessing 
One Attempt at Opening the Suburbs to Affordable Housing, 78 Va. L. Rev. 535, 550 (1992). Sug-
gestions that the adoption of the Act as retribution against the suburbs that supported the 
integration of the Boston schools is beyond the scope of this Article. See id. at 548–50 
(chronicling the history of the statute and acknowledging it as one of “retribution” and 
“vengeance” against the suburbs); Cynthia D. Lacasse, The Anti-Snob Zoning Law: The 
Effectiveness of Chapter 774 in Getting Affordable Housing Built ( June 1987) (unpub-
lished Master’s thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology) (on file with author). “Ac-
cording to Robert Engler, it was passed by a coalition of urban legislators in retaliation for 
the passage of a racial imbalance bill four years earlier that ‘Boston legislators . . . felt . . . 
was being shoved down their throat by liberal suburban legislators.’” Id. at 6. 
More recently, advocates for the statute have introduced other justifications, most no-
tably as a solution to the “brain drain” facing eastern Massachusetts. See Greater Boston 
Chamber of Commerce, Preventing a Brain Drain: Talent Retention in Greater 
Boston 4, 23 (2003), available at http://www.bostonchamber.com/policy/talent_retention. 
pdf (blaming the alleged loss of talent to other jurisdictions—the brain drain—on a short-
age of affordable housing). But see Heather Brome, New England Pub. Policy Ctr., Is 
New England Experiencing a Brain Drain?: Facts About Demographic Change and 
Young Professionals 10 (2007), available at http://www.bos.frb.org/economic/neppc/dp/ 
2007/neppcdp0703.pdf (providing evidence that New England’s supply of educated young 
workers is not shrinking, and, in fact, “the region still maintains a larger share of young 
professionals relative to the size of its population than any other region”). 
28 See, e.g., Mark Bobrowski, Affordable Housing v. Open Space: A Proposal for Reconciliation, 
30 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 487 (2003); Sharon Perlman Krefetz, The Impact and Evolution 
of the Massachusetts Comprehensive Permit and Zoning Appeals Act: Thirty Years of Experience With 
a State Legislative Effort to Overcome Exclusionary Zoning, 22 W. New Eng. L. Rev. 381 (2001); 
Rusty Russell, Equity in Eden: Can Environmental Protection and Affordable Housing Comfortably 
Cohabit in Suburbia?, 30 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 437 (2003); Witten, supra note 19; Chris-
topher Baker, Note, Housing in Crisis—A Call to Reform Massachusetts’s Affordable Housing 
Law, 32 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 165 (2005). 
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within a comprehensive permit project where the underlying zoning 
otherwise permitted the commercial activity.29 
 Where the land is zoned for industrial use, the developer may 
propose residential dwellings. Where the land is zoned for dwelling 
units at a density of two units per acre, the developer may propose ten, 
twelve, or twenty units per acre. Where the height limitation of struc-
tures in the community is thirty-five feet, the developer may propose a 
dwelling height of fifty or eighty feet. Heretofore, it was commonly pre-
sumed that a grant of a comprehensive permit was for the construction 
of housing only, and not principal or ancillary commercial uses or struc-
tures.30 
                                                                                                                      
29 Jepson v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Ipswich, 876 N.E.2d 820, 829–30 (Mass. 2007). 
The SJC noted: 
Flexibility, such as that demonstrated by the minimum percentage of affordable 
housing units required under the statutory scheme, promotes the continued 
development of affordable housing by providing economic incentives (such as 
financial cross-subsidization derived from rental income of market-rate units) to 
developers so they can include in their projects needed affordable housing. Ex-
tending that flexibility to allow an incidental commercial component under the 
umbrella of the comprehensive permit provides additional incentives, including 
economic, to developers to establish affordable housing, and serves to further 
the development of needed affordable housing. 
Id. Seizing the moment, the DHCD codified new regulations that permit nonresidential 
uses and structures within comprehensive permit developments. See 760 Mass. Code Regs. 
56.01–.08 (2008). Note the definition of Project: “A Project may contain ancillary com-
mercial, institutional or other non-residential uses, so long as the non-residential elements 
of the Project are planned and designed to: (a) complement the primary residential uses; 
and (b) help foster vibrant, workable, livable, and attractive neighborhoods consistent with 
applicable local land use plans.” Id. at 56.02. The regulations do not define the catchy 
phrases “vibrant,” “workable,” “livable,” or “attractive.” Consistent with the abandonment 
of predictable outcomes that has defined the statute since 1969, the new regulations leave 
every neighborhood susceptible to a developer’s inclusion of a Wal-Mart, liquor store, or 
movie theater within a comprehensive permit project. After all, Wal-Mart, liquor stores, 
and movie theaters certainly add to the vibrancy, workability, livability, and attractiveness of 
neighborhoods—at least from the perspective of the developer. 
30 Landers v. Bd. of Appeals of Falmouth, 579 N.E.2d 1375, 1376 (Mass. App. Ct. 
1991). The implications of the SJC decision in Jepson, coupled with DHCD’s unprece-
dented maneuver to wrest zoning control away from cities and towns, will, without ques-
tion, be the death of zoning in Massachusetts. The historic and time-tested means of 
amending zoning for land-use changes through the legislative process will become obso-
lete, as it has regarding changes allowing greater density. Empowered with the ability to 
include commercial uses within a comprehensive permit project, the statute, already rep-
resenting legislative anarchy, will cause immeasurable chaos. Not only will neighborhoods 
be subject to unlimited density, those same neighborhoods will be subject to unlimited 
residential densities and commercial development. 
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A. Applicants for a Comprehensive Permit 
 An applicant must: (1) be a public, nonprofit, or “limited divi-
dend”31 organization; (2) provide evidence that the project is “fund-
able” by a subsidizing agency under a low- or moderate-income housing 
program;32 and (3) provide evidence of “site control”33 in order to re-
ceive a comprehensive permit.34 
B. The Application to the Board of Appeals 
 Once these three conditions have been met, the applicant may 
thereafter apply to the local board of appeals for a comprehensive 
                                                                                                                      
31 760 Mass. Code Regs. 56.02 (2008) (defining a “limited dividend organization” as 
one that agrees to be bound by an agreement entered into with a subsidy agency to limit a 
project’s profits to set by the subsidizing agency). “Typically the regulatory agreement 
limits the profits of developers of a 40B home ownership project to no more than 20% of 
total allowable development costs, and through this provision developers are deemed to be 
a ‘limited dividend organization’ meeting the requirements set forth in Chapter 40B.” 
Letter from Gregory W. Sullivan, Inspector Gen., to the Joint Comm. on Hous. (Oct. 23, 
2007), available at http://www.mass.gov/ig/publ/40b_hearing_letter.pdf. 
32 Proof of “fundability” is perfected by the receipt of a “project eligibility” letter from 
a recognized state agency, most notably the Massachusetts Housing Finance Agency 
(MassHousing). See 760 Mass. Code Regs. 56.04(6). Once fundability is established, the 
project remains fundable unless the project eligibility letter is withdrawn. See id. at 
31.01(2)(f). MassHousing identifies itself as “the state’s affordable housing bank.” Mass-
Housing, https://www.masshousing.com (last visited Mar. 27, 2008). It has been desig-
nated as the “project administrator” for the New England Fund, a funding program of 
private banks that has been declared a “federal” subsidy source for the purposes of 40B by 
the Housing Appeals Committee and the SJC. See Town of Middleborough v. Hous. Ap-
peals Comm., 870 N.E.2d 67, 70–71 (Mass. 2007); FHLBBoston, Housing & Economic 
Growth, Funding Programs, New England Fund, http://www.fhlbboston.com/community 
development/fundingprograms/nef/03_02_03e_legislation.jsp (last visited Mar. 27, 2008). 
The Inspector General’s office attacked MassHousing for “moving in a direction which 
would further compromise the oversight process by excluding the municipalities from 
actively participating in the process as monitoring agents” and for overseeing a process 
that is “broken.” Letter from Gregory W. Sullivan, Inspector Gen., to Thomas Gleason, 
Executive Dir., MassHousing (Sept. 13, 2006), available at http://www.mass.gov/ig/publ/ 
masshous.pdf. MassHousing subsequently attacked the Town of Marion when the Town 
challenged the Agency’s malfeasance in issuing a project eligibility letter. Town of Marion 
v. Mass. Hous. Fin. Agency, 861 N.E.2d 468, 470–72 (Mass. App. Ct. 2007). MassHousing 
accused the Town of Marion of filing a frivolous complaint and sought costs and double 
attorney’s fees where the Town alleged that MassHousing failed to perform the due dili-
gence required of it under the comprehensive permit regulations. Id. at 471–72. Note that 
MassHousing sought costs and double attorney’s fees, not the developer of the compre-
hensive permit project. See id. MassHousing’s request was denied. Id. at 472. 
33 760 Mass. Code Regs. 56.04(4)(g) (explaining that site control is established where 
the applicant can demonstrate a sufficient interest in the site). 
34 Id. at 56.04(1)(a)–(c). 
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permit.35 The board’s powers to condition the approval of the applica-
tion, or deny the application outright, are dramatically limited by stat-
ute,36 Housing Appeals Committee decisions,37 and appellate court 
holdings.38 
 It is fiction to suggest that the board of appeals has any substantive 
control over the project or process, save forcing the applicant to spend 
time and money going through the local approval process.39 The 
                                                                                                                      
35 Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 40B, § 20 (2006); 760 Mass. Code Regs. 56.04(1)(a)–(c) 
(enumerating the three condition precedent requirements in order to be eligible to sub-
mit an application for a comprehensive permit). 
36 Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 40B, § 23 (providing the Housing Appeals Committee with two 
alternative resolutions for comprehensive permit disputes, depending on the origin of the 
appeal: (1) those that resulted from a permit denial, and (2) those that resulted from a permit 
approval with conditions that the developer complains render the project “uneconomic”). 
Where the permit was denied by the local board of appeals, the Housing Appeals Committee 
is empowered to vacate the decision and order the issuance of a new permit. Id. 
Where the comprehensive permit is approved by the local board of appeals, the Hous-
ing Appeals Committee’s powers do not include annulling or vacating the board’s deci-
sion, but rather are limited to modifying the board’s decision. Id. (“If the committee finds, 
in the case of an approval with conditions and requirements imposed, that the decision of 
the board makes the building or operation of such housing uneconomic . . . it shall order 
such board to modify or remove any such condition or requirement . . . and to issue any necessary 
permit or approval . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
37 See Witten, supra note 19, at 533. Note, also, that the courts afford considerable def-
erence to an agency’s interpretation of its own regulatory and statutory authority. See, e.g., 
Town of Middleborough v. Hous. Appeals Comm., 870 N.E.2d 67, 76 (Mass. 2007); Warce-
wicz v. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 574 N.E.2d 364, 366 (Mass. 1991); Hellman v. Bd. of Registra-
tion in Med., 537 N.E.2d 150, 152 (Mass. 1989). 
38 See, e.g., Middleborough, 870 N.E.2d 67 (Mass. 2007); Planning Bd. of Hingham v. 
Hingham Campus, LLC, 780 N.E.2d 902 (Mass. 2003); Bd. of Appeals of Hanover v. Hous. 
Appeals Comm., 294 N.E.2d 393 (Mass. 1973); Cohasset Water Comm’n v. Cohasset Zon-
ing Bd. of Appeals, No. 05-P-746, 2007 WL 136631 (Mass. App. Ct. Jan. 19, 2007); Zoning 
Bd. of Appeals of Greenfield v. Hous. Appeals Comm., 446 N.E.2d 748 (Mass. App. Ct. 
1983). 
39 Many have suggested that the local board has discretionary authority in its review of 
comprehensive permit applications. This discretion is an illusion. See, e.g., Zoning Bd. of 
Appeals of Greenfield, 446 N.E.2d at 754 n.13. The court stated: 
[B]ut the statute does not require that a noncomplying city or town issue a 
permit in every case where the ten percent test has not been met. In such a 
case the statute imposes a general test of reasonableness predicated on the 
regional need for low and moderate income housing; the number of low in-
come people in the affected municipality; health and safety considerations; 
and the promotion of compatible site and building design and preservation 
of open spaces. We think the statute provides an adequate decisional frame-
work for dealing with the problem of proposed developments which could 
cause a community to overshoot substantially the ten percent benchmark for 
low and moderate income housing. 
Id. (citation omitted). Even the Citizens’ Housing and Planning Association (CHAPA), a 
vocal and active supporter of the statute, had trouble offering an answer to its own ques-
 
2008] Revising Massachusetts's Affordable Housing and Anti-Snob Zoning 227 
Chairman of the Housing Appeals Committee shared his personal views 
of the comprehensive permit statute in an article where he suggested 
that the comprehensive permit law was one not of “command-and-
control regulation,” but rather “market-based, incentive-based regula-
tion.”40 
 Anyone who has participated in the comprehensive permit proc-
ess, from initial filings with the board of appeals to a decision from 
the Housing Appeals Committee, must wonder whether she has par-
ticipated in the same process as the one discussed by the Chairman.41 
 The comprehensive permit process is precisely a command-and-
control system, notwithstanding the Chairman’s attempt to label it oth-
erwise. Worse, DHCD has orchestrated a process whereby cities and 
towns are led to believe that the comprehensive permit statute is their 
statute and one that they can use in a creative and opportunistic man-
ner.42 But the facts are irrefutable. The statute takes away all local au-
thority and leaves nothing in its place. First, the comprehensive permit 
application is developer, not municipality, driven. It is the developer 
who decides where the project will be located, how many units the pro-
                                                                                                                      
tion, “Do Communities Have Control Over the Proposed Development?” Citizens’ Hous-
ing & Planning Association, Fact Sheet on 40B: The State’s Affordable Housing Zoning 
Law 3 (Oct. 2007), http://www.chapa.org/pdf/40BFactSheetOctober2007.pdf. The Fact 
Sheet answered the question as follows: 
Zoning boards and other town officials often work with developers to modify 
the project. Furthermore, the zoning board may include conditions and re-
quirements on any aspect of the project such as height, density, site plan, util-
ity improvements, or long-term affordability—provided these conditions do 
not make the development economically unfeasible. 
Id. 
40 Werner Lohe, The Massachusetts Comprehensive Permit Law: Collaboration Between Afford-
able Housing Advocates and Environmentalists, Land Use L. & Zoning Dig., May 2000, at 3. 
41 The author has acted as counsel in numerous Housing Appeals Committee matters 
representing cities and towns and intervenors. He cannot recall any proceeding before the 
Committee wherein command and control—that is the Committee’s command and con-
trol—did not dominate the proceedings and the outcome. 
42 See Edith M. Netter, Mass. Hous. P’ship, Local 40B Review and Decision Guide-
lines 1–2 (2005), available at https://www.masshousing.com/portal/server.pt/gateway/ 
PTARGS_0_210_365_0_0_18/Local40B%20ReviewDecisionGuidelines.pdf. 
 In light of the changes to Chapter 40B in practice and regulation, the 
guidelines outlined below attempt to assist communities in reviewing com-
prehensive permit projects in a way that maximizes the opportunity for a suc-
cessful outcome. A successful outcome could mean a project approval or in 
appropriate instances, a denial. These guidelines suggest that a negotiated 
outcome will, in most cases, garner the best result for a community. 
Id. at 2. 
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ject will contain, and whether to offer on- or off-site improvements to 
mitigate the impact of the development. Second, the application can 
be in complete derogation of any plan or policy adopted by the com-
munity. There is no requirement, even where the municipality has 
adopted and approved a “master plan, comprehensive plan, or com-
munity development plan,” that a comprehensive permit developer 
complies with the plan.43 Third, the ticket to apply to the board of ap-
peals—the project eligibility letter—cannot be challenged independent 
of the comprehensive permit,44 and, in the words of the ticketing 
agency, MassHousing, is simply a “business judgment” decision.45 
Fourth, the very issues that matter most to the community once the 
project is built—ensuring affordability and monitoring excess profits— 
have been stripped away by the Housing Appeals Committee.46 
C. The Housing Appeals Committee and the Department of Housing and 
Community Development 
 In one of several decisions on the same subject, the Housing Ap-
peals Committee recently ruled that, notwithstanding the fraud uncov-
ered by the Inspector General’s office and the pleas from the Inspector 
General to ensure municipal participation in the cost-certification and 
monitoring process, as it is “broken,”47 the Committee ruled that a 
                                                                                                                      
43 See 760 Mass. Code Regs. 56.07(3)(g) (2008) (“The Committee may receive evi-
dence of and shall consider” whether a city or town has a plan and its results in implement-
ing that plan). 
44 Town of Marion v. Mass. Hous. Fin. Agency, 861 N.E.2d 468, 471 (Mass. App. Ct. 
2007) (“[T]he funding eligibility determination is merely an interim step in the adminis-
trative process.”). 
45 See Brief on Behalf of Defendant Massachusetts Housing Finance Agency at 20, Town 
of Marion, 861 N.E.2d 468 (No. 05-P-1848). In opposing the Town of Marion’s claim that 
MassHousing failed to perform the due diligence required prior to issuing a project eligi-
bility letter for a comprehensive permit project, MassHousing stated that it was not re-
quired to “solicit or defer to local opinions about which projects should or should not be 
funded. It creates a housing bank, not a forum or tribunal. It provides absolutely no basis 
for a challenge by a community to any eligibility or funding decision by MassHousing.” Id. 
at 23–24. 
46 The Committee must be distinguished from the Chairman. The Chairman, or the 
Committee’s additional hearing officer, conducts the adjudicatory hearings. 760 Mass. 
Code Regs. 56.06(7)(e). The Housing Appeals Committee consists of five members, one 
of whom is the Chairman. The remaining four Committee members, while they sign deci-
sions rendered by the Committee, do not attend the adjudicatory hearings and do not vote 
in a public meeting. Upon information and belief, opportunities to present arguments 
before the full Committee have never been permitted. “Do not arouse the wrath of the 
great and powerful Oz. I said come back tomorrow.” The Wizard of Oz (MGM 1939). 
47 See Letter from Gregory W. Sullivan, supra note 32. 
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town’s attempts to ensure that the affordable housing units were prop-
erly preserved “‘[were] clearly not matters of local concern,’” that 
“MassHousing may unilaterally decided those issues,” and that “the 
condition in the comprehensive permit requiring submission to and 
approval by the Board of a draft Regulatory Agreement is improper 
and thus void.”48 
 Quite simply, there is no legal basis for the Housing Appeals 
Committee’s or DHCD’s eristic position—only an assertion of über au-
thority that, until recently, has gone unchallenged by cities and towns. 
The statute itself empowers the board of appeals to address an unlim-
ited range of issues through appropriate conditions on the comprehen-
sive permit.49 No other section of chapter 40B, any regulation, or any 
judicial decision limits the scope of issues that boards may address 
through conditions to ensure that 40B developers do not “enrich them-
selves at the expense of the municipalities and their affordable housing 
initiatives,”50 as DHCD and MassHousing have failed to do. 
 DHCD can cite to no statute, regulation, or judicial decision pro-
hibiting the board from imposing regulatory conditions based on a 
municipality’s valid local concerns, and consistent with its affordable 
housing needs—for example, limiting the project to ownership, rather 
than rental units; setting aside the project’s affordable units for local 
residents; or ensuring the perpetual affordability of units through a 
restriction of its own design. 
 It is fair to ask why DHCD is so insistent that it has exclusive au-
thority with respect to regulatory conditions that the statute reserves to 
boards of appeals. Why, where a municipality has granted a compre-
hensive permit for the construction of affordable housing is the agency 
so adamant that it, not the town, select the monitoring agent? Similarly, 
why would the agency, not the town, specify how cost certification will 
be conducted and by whom? Why would the agency, not the town, de-
termine how to monitor the sale or rental of affordable units and by 
whom? Such regulatory and monitoring conditions, while unnecessary 
in the realm of conventional development, are unfortunately necessary 
                                                                                                                      
48 Groton Residential Gardens, LLC, No. 05-26, slip op. at 11, 13 (Mass. Housing Ap-
peals Committee Aug. 10, 2006) (quoting CMA, Inc., No. 89-25, slip op. at 7 (Mass. Hous-
ing Appeals Committee June 25, 1992)) (involving the Groton Board of Appeals); see also 
Attitash Views, LLC, No. 06-17, slip op. at 1 (Mass. Housing Appeals Committee Oct. 15, 
2007) (involving the Amesbury Zoning Board of Appeals). 
49 See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 40B, § 21 (2006). 
50 See Letter from Gregory W. Sullivan, supra note 32 (noting that “the cost certifica-
tion and monitoring process is ‘broken’”). 
230 Environmental Affairs [Vol. 35:217 
in chapter 40B permitting, in order to prevent “the transfer of profit 
from a municipality’s affordable trust fund to a developer’s personal 
bank account.”51 To the extent that a town might benefit from agency 
expertise with respect to programmatic and regulatory issues, such ex-
pertise may be placed at the town’s disposal by way of technical assis-
tance rather than by way of threat and assertions of supremacy. 
 It is also fair to ask why DHCD continues to insist on its own exper-
tise, and that of MassHousing, with respect to regulatory issues in light 
of MassHousing’s well-documented and abysmal failure to provide ade-
quate oversight of the regulatory components of chapter 40B pro-
jects—such as the cost certification and limited dividend requirements. 
 As a result of MassHousing’s inability or unwillingness to perform 
its oversight obligations for New England Fund and Housing Starts pro-
jects, “reported developer profits were routinely and substantially un-
derstated,” resulting “in many cases . . . [of] profit windfalls to the de-
velopers which deprived the respective municipalities of the excess 
profits that should have been paid to the municipality under the regu-
latory agreements.”52 
 In light of the failure of MassHousing and DHCD to perform their 
oversight obligations, one might expect DHCD to rethink its claims of 
                                                                                                                      
51 See Letter from Gregory W. Sullivan, Inspector Gen., to Aaron Gornstein, Executive 
Dir., CHAPA (Dec. 6, 2006), available at http://www.mass.gov/ig/publ/40bchapa.pdf; see 
also Letter from Gregory W. Sullivan, Inspector Gen., to Ben Tafoya, Chairman, Bd. of 
Selectman, Town of Reading, and Peter Hechenbleikner, Town Manager, Town of Reading 
( Jan. 2, 2007), available at http://www.mass.gov/ig/publ/40b_reading.pdf (detailing re-
sults of an independent audit of a New England Fund project in Reading, finding gross 
understatement of developer profit, impermissible land valuations, related-party transac-
tions, and other abuses). 
52 See Letter from Gregory W. Sullivan, Inspector Gen., to Thomas R. Gleason, Executive 
Dir., MassHousing (Sept. 13, 2006), available at http://www.mass.gov/ig/publ/masshous. 
pdf. The Inspector General specifically noted the failure of designated monitoring agents 
to identify such abuses: 
In general the cost certification “audits” performed against these financial 
statements by the appointed monitoring agent either failed to uncover or 
challenge these apparent abuses and reinforced the developer’s understated 
profit margins. 
 In the opinion of this Office, many municipalities have a false sense of se-
curity that effective cost certification monitoring and enforcement is being 
conducted by the subsidizing agencies on their behalf. The reality is that de-
velopers are taking advantage of a weak oversight system and are enriching 
themselves at the expense of the municipalities and their affordable housing 
initiatives. Thus, local initiatives to expand and create affordable housing, 
with these excess profits, have been thwarted by the apparent manipulation 
by developers in a poorly-monitored oversight system. 
Id. 
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expertise. At the very least, one might expect some introspection on 
the part of both agencies—none appears to be forthcoming. 
D. The Comprehensive Permit 
 The applicant’s sole obligation is to provide twenty or twenty-five 
percent of the dwelling units within the project for rent or sale to those 
designated by the subsidy program as meeting affordable criteria.53 
Simply put, for a return of an unlimited density and a project not bound 
by any local rule or regulation, the applicant is required to set aside a 
percentage of the dwelling units at an affordable rental or sale price.54 
The benefits to the developer are obvious. Where zoning would allow 
ten dwelling units, a developer may propose one hundred, with seventy-
five—i.e., sixty-five more than would otherwise be allowed—sold without 
restriction. The benefits to the community are far less obvious. 
 While it is true that the community now has an additional twenty-
five below-market-rate dwelling units, these units are built at a location 
and density of the developer’s, not the municipality’s, choosing. The 
density bonus afforded the developer—one hundred units as opposed 
to ten—has not been anticipated by the city or town’s school, police, or 
fire departments. The bonus has not been incorporated into capital 
plans or budgets, nor wastewater treatment or water supply planning 
needs. 
 Where a board of appeals approves the application with conditions 
that the applicant finds objectionable, or denies the application, the 
developer has the right to appeal to the Housing Appeals Committee, a 
five-member agency established to review and adjudicate appeals from 
disgruntled developers pursuant to chapter 40B, section 22.55 Chroni-
cled elsewhere, the Housing Appeals Committee has shown little—if 
any—sympathy to the concerns expressed by boards of appeals.56 In 
recent decisions, the Committee has scaled a new level of arrogance, 
holding, for example, that the statute permits the appropriation of 
                                                                                                                      
53 See MassHousing, Housing Starts Process and Guidelines 3 (2007), available at 
https://www.masshousing.com/portal/server.pt/gateway/PTARGS_0_2_376_0_0_18/HS_
Guidelines.pdf (twenty-five percent of the dwelling units required to be set aside); Mass-
Development, Housing, www.massdevelopment.com/custom/housing.aspx (last visited 
Mar. 27, 2008) (twenty percent of the dwelling units to be set aside to qualify for low in-
come housing tax credit). The subsidizing agency establishes the number of dwelling units 
that are to be set aside at below market rates. See MassHousing, supra, at 3; MassDevelop-
ment, supra. 
54 See MassHousing, supra note 53, at 3; MassDevelopment, supra note 53. 
55 Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 23B, § 5A (2006). 
56 See Witten, supra note 19, at 533. 
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municipal land to assist a developer’s comprehensive permit applica-
tion.57 In a narrowly tailored decision, the SJC reversed the Superior 
                                                                                                                      
57 Wash. Green Dev., LLC, No. 04-09, slip op. at 17–18 (Mass. Housing Appeals Com-
mittee Sept. 20, 2005) (involving the Groton Board of Appeals). 
 Though this Committee has the power to order approval of an easement, 
the question remains as to whether it is justified under the facts presented. 
. . . . The town has not drawn our attention to, nor do we see from all the evi-
dence presented to us, any harm that can possibly be done by slight regrading 
and removing of vegetation along a strip of land that is approximately ten 
feet wide at its widest point. We find that such changes do not raise a suffi-
cient local concern to outweigh the regional need for affordable housing. We 
therefore conclude that [Groton Electric Light Department’s] refusal to 
grant an easement is not consistent with local needs, and we will order it. 
Id. The Superior Court upheld the Committee’s decision, referring to the lost property 
right as “minimal” and referenced the SJC’s holding in Board of Appeals of Maynard v. Hous-
ing Appeals Committee. See Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Groton v. Hous. Appeals Comm., No. 
053733L, 2007 WL 1540233, at *2 (Mass. Super. Ct. Feb. 9, 2007) (citing Bd. of Appeals of 
Maynard v. Hous. Appeals Comm., 345 N.E.2d 382, 385–86 (Mass. 1976)) (concluding the 
comprehensive permit statute empowers a board of appeals—and the Housing Appeals 
Committee—to eliminate the need for a town meeting vote to extend a municipal sewer 
line). The Committee was not troubled by the fact that the statutes clearly require legisla-
tive approval as a required condition precedent to the conveyance of interests in munici-
pal real property, choosing instead to conclude that the comprehensive permit statute 
trumps even property disposition requirements imposed upon local governments. See 
Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 30B, § 16 (2006) (requiring process for conveying interests in mu-
nicipal real property with a value greater than $25,000); Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 40, § 3 
(2006) (requiring process for conveying interests in municipal property acquired by cities 
and towns by purchase); Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 40, § 15 (requiring process for conveying 
interests in municipal property acquired by a means other than purchase, such as by aban-
donment); Groton, 2007 WL 1540233 at *2. While the Groton matter involved the convey-
ance of an easement, the principle relied upon in Groton—that chapter 40B allows a board 
of appeals and the Housing Appeals Committee to order, summarily, the transfer of mu-
nicipal property notwithstanding no less than two statutory requirements prohibiting it 
without compliance with due process—will most certainly be used by entrepreneurial de-
velopers in the future. See id. A developer who needs access through public property—the 
Boston Public Gardens, for example—can, following the Groton decision, simply ask the 
local board of appeals to approve the same, and if the local board declines, the Housing 
Appeals Committee’s largesse awaits. Even more perverse, if the Housing Appeals Commit-
tee can order an interest in municipal property to be conveyed to a private developer, then 
certainly the same Committee can order private property to be conveyed to a private devel-
oper. After all, the Committee could argue, private property taken from A (a landowner) 
would be serving the same public purpose by providing it to B (the developer) as was 
found constitutional in Kelo v. City of New London, among other cases. See, e.g., 545 U.S. 469, 
479, 483–84 (2005). These hypothetical situations are not exaggerated. See Town of Mid-
dleborough v. Hous. Appeals Comm., 870 N.E.2d 68, 76 (Mass. 2007) (“[W]e recognize 
that ‘[w]here the focus of a statutory enactment is reform,’ as is true of the [comprehen-
sive permit] act, ‘the administrative agency charged with its implementation should con-
strue it broadly so as to further the goals of such reform.’” (quoting Mass. Fed’n of Teach-
ers, AFT, AFL-CIO v. Bd. of Educ., 767 N.E.2d 549, 559 (Mass. 2002)) (second alteration in 
original) (citation omitted)). 
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Court’s holding and reaffirmed that the Housing Appeals Committee 
lacks the authority to override state, as opposed to local, laws and regu-
lations.58 
 A board of appeals may avoid a developer’s appeal to the Housing 
Appeals Committee only by demonstrating that the city or town afford-
able housing is “consistent with local needs,” a formulistic determina-
tion included in both statute and regulation.59 As discussed below, 
however, a board of appeals is not precluded from approving compre-
hensive permit applications—one or all—even after the municipality 
has achieved the “consistent with local needs” standard.60 
E. Judicial Review of Comprehensive Permit Decisions 
 In a remarkable decision, the SJC held that an abutter to a com-
prehensive permit development did not have standing to challenge the 
project with respect to a claim of depreciation of property values.61 The 
Court concluded that an abutter to a 115-unit rental housing project, 
located in a zoning district that was limited to single-family dwellings, 
could not raise property devaluation as a cognizable claim sufficient to 
confer standing.62 
 The Court’s holding in Standerwick v. Zoning Board of Appeals of An-
dover is singularly painful in a long list of holdings regarding the com-
prehensive permit statute.63 The courts have demonstrated little regard 
                                                                                                                      
58 See Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Groton v. Hous. Appeals Comm., SJC-10028, 2008 WL 
820294, at *4–5 (Mass. Mar. 31, 2008). 
59 Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 40B, § 20 (2006) (providing three mechanisms for achieving 
consistency with local needs status: (1) ten percent of a municipality’s housing stock subsi-
dized; (2) one and one half percent of the municipality’s land area being comprised of 
subsidized housing; or (3) at least three-tenths of one percent of the municipality’s land 
area, or ten acres, is subject to dwelling unit construction pursuant to the statute within a 
one year period); 760 Mass. Code Regs. 56.03 (2008) (providing four additional mecha-
nisms for achieving consistency with local needs status: (1) “Recent Progress Toward Hous-
ing Unit Minimum”; (2) the project is a large scale project; (3) approval of a Housing Pro-
duction Plan; and (4) “Related Applications”). 
60 Boothroyd v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Amherst, 868 N.E.2d 83, 84–85, 88–89 (Mass. 
2007). 
61 Standerwick v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Andover, 849 N.E.2d 197, 200 (Mass. 2006). 
62 Id. at 200, 201, 206 (“The preservation of real estate values of property abutting an 
affordable housing development is clearly not a concern that the G.L. c. 40B regulatory 
scheme is intended to protect.”). 
63 See, e.g., Town of Middleborough v. Hous. Appeals Comm., 870 N.E.2d 67, 80 (Mass. 
2007) (noting federal subsidy for use in a comprehensive permit project includes loans 
originating from private banks that are members of the Federal Home Loan Bank of Bos-
ton, a private, for-profit corporation); Boothroyd, 868 N.E.2d at 88–89 (stating comprehen-
sive permits may be issued by a board of appeals notwithstanding community’s consistent 
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with local needs standards as the proper measurement is the regional need for affordable 
housing); Standerwick, 849 N.E.2d at 200; Dennis Hous. Corp. v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of 
Dennis, 785 N.E.2d 682, 690–91 (Mass. 2003) (explaining comprehensive permit statute 
allows local board of appeals to waive historic district regulations, adopted by the Legisla-
ture, applicable to Route 6A on Cape Cod); Planning Bd. of Hingham v. Hingham Cam-
pus, LLC, 780 N.E.2d 902, 903 (Mass. 2003) (deciding comprehensive permit statute does 
not extend standing to challenge a comprehensive permit to a municipal planning board); 
Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Wellesley v. Ardemore Apartments Ltd. P’ship, 767 N.E.2d 584, 
586 (Mass. 2002) (“[W]here a comprehensive permit itself does not specify for how long 
housing units must remain below market, the Act requires an owner to maintain the units 
as affordable for as long as the housing is not in compliance with local zoning require-
ments.”); Bd. of Appeals of Hanover v. Hous. Appeals Comm., 294 N.E.2d 393, 424 (Mass. 
1973) (concluding comprehensive permit statute does not violate equal protection or due 
process guarantees). 
On February 5, 2008, the SJC heard oral argument in an appeal of an Appeals Court 
decision overturning a Superior Court holding that an abutter to a comprehensive permit 
project loses his right to appeal under chapter 40B, section 21 (referencing chapter 40A, 
section 17) where the Housing Appeals Committee rules in favor of the applicant in the 
applicant’s appeal to the Committee under chapter 40B, section 22. Taylor v. Bd. of Ap-
peals of Lexington, 865 N.E.2d 1140 (Table) (2007) (granting further appellate review); 
Taylor v. Bd. of Appeals of Lexington, 863 N.E.2d 79, 84–86 (Mass. App. Ct. 2007) review 
granted, 865 N.E.2d 1140 (Table) (2007). The Appeals Court recognized the abutter’s 
statutory right of appeal and held that chapter 40B provides for “two distinct avenues of 
appeal” from the issuance of a comprehensive permit by a municipal board. Taylor, 863 
N.E.2d at 82. As argued by the applicant, a decision by the Housing Appeals Committee 
trumps or moots an abutter’s appeal pursuant to chapter 40B, section 21. Id. at 83. 
The two types of comprehensive permit appeals—the abutter’s appeal for judicial re-
view under chapter 40A, section 17 and the developer’s administrative appeal—differ 
greatly in both substance and procedure. These differences give rise to two different types 
of appellate record, and present issues to the trial court in a significantly different posture. 
Consequently, neither appeal may be substituted for the other or may be said to moot the 
other. Appeals to the Housing Appeals Committee are not intended as the equivalent of 
court proceedings with the use of discovery, motions practice, and trial to achieve resolu-
tion of all disputed issues between parties. Rather, such appeals are intended to provide an 
expedited form of review for the developer on a narrow range of issues. By design, Hous-
ing Appeals Committee proceedings do not air and adjudicate the full range of issues aris-
ing from the grant of a comprehensive permit, such as the claims of abutters. The scope of 
issues that abutter-interveners are permitted to raise, and present relative evidence, has 
been further narrowed by decisions of the Committee. See, e.g., Grandview Realty, Inc., No. 
05-11, slip op. at 3–4 (Mass. Housing Appeals Committee Feb. 10, 2006) (involving the 
Lexington Zoning Board of Appeals). 
The Committee has repeatedly held, for example, that abutter-interveners are not 
permitted to raise programmatic or financial issues relating to project proposals, or to 
challenge the existence of jurisdictional prerequisites for comprehensive permit applica-
tions. See, e.g., id. The administrative record on appeal to the Superior Court under chap-
ter 30A, section 14, therefore, contains no evidence on programmatic, financial, or juris-
dictional issues—or any other issues excluded by the hearing officer at his or her 
discretion—that abutter-interveners sought to preserve. Since, under chapter 30A, section 
14, review is confined to the administrative record, there is no subsequent opportunity 
during Superior Court proceedings for the abutter-interveners to place evidence in the 
record regarding their claims. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 30A, § 14(5) (2006). Finally, due to 
the different standards of review in the two types of appeals, an issue raised by an abutter 
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for the consequences of unpredictable land-use decisions and whether 
infliction of such injury on individuals—abutters—to comprehensive 
permit projects serves the statute’s purported goal of producing af-
fordable housing. It is not as if the courts do not recognize the obvi-
ous—that the costs and investments one makes in purchasing a home 
are enormous.64 
                                                                                                                      
seeking judicial review under chapter 40A, section 17 is in an entirely different posture 
than the same abutter raising an issue in appeal under chapter 30A, section 14. The judge 
reviewing a comprehensive permit under chapter 40A owes no deference to the board, 
and makes independent findings of fact. See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 40A, § 17 (2006). The 
judge reviewing a decision of the Housing Appeals Committee must defer to agency dis-
cretion and is limited to the facts found in the administrative record. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 
30A, § 14(5). An abutter in a chapter 40A appeal is able to place evidence in the record 
regarding programmatic issues, upon which the trial judge may make findings of fact. See 
Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 40A, § 17. The same abutter, assuming he or she is granted intervener 
status, will be precluded from placing such evidence in the administrative record—and 
thus prevented from having the issue reviewed by the trial court on appeal under chapter 
30A. As a result, abutters face a wholly different burden proving their case before a judge 
in a chapter 30A appeal of a chapter 40B permit as compared to a chapter 40A appeal. 
In addition, the SJC has accepted on direct appellate review a related case from Middle-
sex Superior Court, Taylor v. Housing Appeals Committee, consolidated with a Norfolk Superior 
Court case, Board of Appeals of Canton v. Housing Appeals Committee, where the two courts 
reached different conclusions as to when a municipality is entitled to measure consistency 
with local needs. Supreme Judicial Court, Amicus Announcement, SJC-10048 and SJC-10057, 
http://www.mass.gov/courts/sjc/amicus/sjc-10048-10057.html (last visited Mar. 27, 2008). In 
the Norfolk decision, a Superior Court judge ruled that the measurement occurs when the 
Housing Appeals Committee renders its decision. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Canton v. Hous. 
Appeals Comm., Civ. Action No. 2005-1868 (Mass. Super. Ct. Nov. 10, 2006) (Grabau, J.). The 
Middlesex Superior Court judge ruled that the measurement occurs much earlier; when the 
board of appeals files its decision with the local clerk. Taylor v. Hous. Appeals Comm., Civ. 
Action No. 2005-2910-B (Mass. Super. Ct. Apr. 5, 2007) (Kottmyer, J.). 
64 See Vazza v. Bd. of Appeals of Brockton, 269 N.E.2d 270, 274 (Mass. 1971) (“Pur-
chasers of real estate are entitled to rely on the applicable zoning ordinances or by-laws in 
determining the uses which may be made of the parcel they are buying . . . . For many 
persons, particularly those purchasing houses, this is the largest single investment in their 
lives.”). More recently, in a dissenting opinion in a case involving the question of when 
expansions to a preexisting nonconforming structure required a special permit pursuant 
to chapter 40A, section 6, Justice Cordy wrote, “Requiring homeowners to run such an 
administrative gauntlet impedes and burdens the upgrade of a large part of our housing 
stock, much of which (except perhaps along the water or on the island of Martha’s Vine-
yard) is relatively ‘affordable.’” Bransford v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Edgartown, 832 
N.E.2d 639, 651 (Mass. 2005); see also Bjorklund v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Norwell, 450 
Mass. 357, 357 (2008) (reexamining and upholding the Bransford decision). “The expan-
sion of smaller houses into significantly larger ones decreases the availability of would-be 
‘starter’ homes in a community, perhaps excluding families of low to moderate income 
individuals.” Id. at 363 ( Justices Cordy and Ireland dissenting). 
Justice Cordy’s “relatively ‘affordable’” comment has been raised by many with refer-
ence to the requirements of the comprehensive permit statute. Mobile homes are relatively 
affordable, yet they do not count toward a municipality’s affordable housing stock. Dwell-
ing units that sell at or below eighty percent of median income, but unencumbered by 
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 The court’s interpretation of chapter 40B, section 20 in Standerwick 
allows an abutter to a comprehensive permit project to raise claims of 
injury with regard to the project’s impacts on the “health or safety of 
the occupants of the proposed housing or of the residents of the city or 
town” but not with regard to impacts to her property or her health or 
safety.65 The holding in Standerwick destroys an abutter’s statutory right 
of appeal by reducing to generalized—as opposed to particularized— 
her claims of injury; generalized claims of injury are not sufficient to 
confer standing.66 This outcome may have been intended: 
[W]e have no hesitation in concluding that granting standing 
to challenge the issuance of a comprehensive permit under 
G.L. c. 40B, § 21, to those who claim a diminution in the value 
of their property frustrates the intent of the Legislature. . . . 
 . . . It would grant standing to challenge a comprehensive 
permit to persons who object to the construction of any af-
fordable housing project simply by claims that the introduc-
tion of affordable housing for low and moderate income per-
sons would cause their property values to drop.67 
 No appraisal is required to conclude that the presence of a 115-
unit apartment building abutting single-family dwellings in a rural 
portion of the community will cause the single-family dwellings to lose 
market value. Common sense alone suffices. That some of the dwell-
                                                                                                                      
anything other than the real estate market, do not count toward a municipality’s afford-
able housing stock. These units do not count simply because the development industry 
does not profit from their construction—for example, mobile homes are not stick built and 
are not manufactured in Massachusetts. Further, these units do not count because the 
development and real estate industry has little incentive to see cities and towns achieve 
“consistent with local needs” status by the incremental addition of accessory apartments 
that, while truly affordable and serving an obvious need—such as the housing of a relative 
or low wage worker—do not align with their singularly myopic and selfish motives. “‘Allow-
ing mobile homes to be counted undermines the integrity of Chapter 40B.’” Jenn Abelson, 
Bill Puts a Mobile Spin on Affordable Housing, Boston Globe, May 18, 2004, at B1 (quoting 
Aaron Gornstein, Executive Director of Citizens Housing and Planning Association, re-
garding a bill put forward by the Massachusetts House of Representatives allowing cities 
and towns to count one half of their mobile homes toward their subsidized housing inven-
tory). “‘This sets a dangerous precedent,’ Gornstein said. ‘If mobile homes are approved, 
it kicks the door open to counting other types of housing that are not truly affordable 
housing.’” Id. The bill did not pass. 
65 Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 40A, § 20; Standerwick, 849 N.E.2d at 210–11. 
66 See Standerwick, 849 N.E.2d at 210–11 (“When the persons challenging a permit con-
cede that they have nothing more than unfounded speculation to support their claims of 
injury, our law does not require that a developer come forward with expert evidence to 
challenge every such speculative injury.”). 
67 Id. at 206. 
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ing units will be rented at affordable prices is irrelevant to the dimi-
nution of value. While it may be true that the inclusion of below-
market-rate rental units will make the matter worse for the abutters, it 
cannot be reasonably disputed that the values of the abutting single-
family dwellings will be dramatically impacted.68 
 Adding to the irony of Standerwick is the fact that, had Ms. 
Standerwick been an abutter to a 115-unit rental housing project per-
mitted by special permit pursuant to the state zoning act and the town’s 
local zoning bylaw, her claims of property devaluation would have been 
sufficient to confer standing.69 It would have been the exact same pro-
ject, yet it would have yielded a different result for Ms. Standerwick. 
 A comprehensive permit project provides no opportunity for the 
abutter to assert property devaluation as grounds for standing to file 
litigation.70 A project permitted by zoning, of the exact same density— 
and including below-market-rate dwellings—allows the abutter to raise 
                                                                                                                      
68 The effect of apartment buildings on single-family neighborhoods similar to the one at 
issue in Standerwick has been extensively discussed, but no empirical analysis exists regarding 
the impact a large rental housing project would have on abutting single-family properties. See 
generally Ingrid Gould Ellen et al., Does Federally Subsidized Rental Housing Depress Neighborhood 
Property Values? (N.Y. Univ. Law Sch. Working Paper, Paper No. 05-04, 2005), available at http:// 
www.furmancenter.nyu.edu/publications/fedrentalC_march05ffr.pdf (discussing analysis of 
public housing project impacts on property values in New York City with citations to decades 
of previous investigations). 
The Supreme Court addressed this issue in the landmark zoning decision of Village of 
Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co. See 272 U.S. 365, 394–95 (1926). The Court stated: 
With particular reference to apartment houses, it is pointed out that the devel-
opment of detached house sections is greatly retarded by the coming of apart-
ment houses, which has sometimes resulted in destroying the entire section for 
private house purposes; that in such sections very often the apartment house is 
a mere parasite, constructed in order to take advantage of the open spaces and 
attractive surroundings created by the residential character of the district. 
Moreover, the coming of one apartment house is followed by others, interfering 
by their height and bulk with the free circulation of air and monopolizing the 
rays of the sun which otherwise would fall upon the smaller homes, and bring-
ing, as their necessary accompaniments, the disturbing noises incident to in-
creased traffic and business, and the occupation, by means of moving and 
parked automobiles, of larger portions of the streets, thus detracting from their 
safety and depriving children of the privilege of quiet and open spaces for play, 
enjoyed by those in more favored localities,—until, finally, the residential char-
acter of the neighborhood and its desirability as a place of detached residences 
are utterly destroyed. Under these circumstances, apartment houses, which in a 
different environment would be not only entirely unobjectionable but highly 
desirable, come very near to being nuisances. 
Id. 
69 See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 40A, §§ 8–9; Witten, supra note 19, at 547 n.148. 
70 See Standerwick, 849 N.E.2d at 210–11. 
238 Environmental Affairs [Vol. 35:217 
property devaluation as grounds for injury.71 This discrepancy in results 
is untenable.72 
 That Ms. Standerwick is barred from raising property devaluation 
as grounds of injury in an appeal of a comprehensive permit project, 
but is not barred from raising the same claim with regard to a project 
of the exact same size filed pursuant to local zoning, fails to satisfy the 
basic standard of rationality.73 
 Even if the intent of the statute is to encourage or require cities 
and towns to ensure that each has at least ten percent of its housing 
stock set aside as affordable, the Standerwick court’s holding implicitly 
suggests that the town’s failure to reach the ten percent mandate is Ms. 
Standerwick’s fault. Only she and her fellow abutters will suffer the 
consequences of the town’s inability or unwillingness to achieve the 
state’s targets. Those in other parts of town might have sympathy for 
Ms. Standerwick and her neighbors, but more likely they will delight in 
silence knowing that Ms. Standerwick may very well have protected 
them from future comprehensive permit projects in their backyards. 
 There are those who suggest that Ms. Standerwick’s plight could 
have been avoided if the town had simply conformed to the statute’s 
                                                                                                                      
71 See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 40A, §§ 9, 17. 
72 While the Vazza court recognized a home buyer’s financial investment, the Stander-
wick court may have overlooked a home buyer’s emotional investment. See discussion supra 
note 64. Compare Standerwick, 849 N.E.2d at 210–11 (deciding abutters do not have stand-
ing to challenge a comprehensive permit because their property values drop), with Vazza v. 
Bd. of Appeals of Brockton, 269 N.E.2d 270, 274 (Mass. 1971) (noting that buying a home 
is one of the largest purchases a person makes in her life, and so, she should be able to rely 
on applicable local zoning laws). The American dream of homeownership, though, must 
certainly be defined both as an emotional and a financial investment. See Yai Listokin, Con-
fronting the Barriers to Native American Homeownership on Tribal Lands: The Case of the Navajo 
Partnership for Housing, 33 Urb. Law. 433, 445 (2001) (“Because they want to build on an-
cestral land that they will occupy for many years, the Navajo often wish to build a home 
that will meet their needs for a lifetime.”). 
73 See Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 959–60 (Mass. 2003) (“The 
Massachusetts Constitution requires, at a minimum, that the exercise of the state’s regulatory 
authority not be ‘arbitrary or capricious.’”); Commonweath v. Henry’s Drywall Co., 320 
N.E.2d 911, 915 (Mass. 1974). Under both the equality and liberty guarantees, regulatory 
authority must, at very least, serve “a legitimate purpose in a rational way”; a statute must 
“bear[] a reasonable relation to a permissible legislative objective.” Rushworth v. Registrar of 
Motor Vehicles, 596 N.E.2d 340, 344 (Mass. 1992); see, e.g., Mass. Fed’n of Teachers v. Bd. of 
Educ., 767 N.E.2d 549, 561–62 (Mass. 2002) (equal protection); Coffee-Rich, Inc. v. Comm’r 
of Pub. Health, 204 N.E.2d 281, 287 (Mass. 1965) (due process). “Any law failing to satisfy the 
basic standards of rationality is void.” Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 960. 
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clear requirements—simply put—construct ten percent of the town’s 
housing stock as affordable. Such suggestions are wrong.74 
 Remarkably, again, the SJC recently ruled that the longheld be-
lief that achieving the Holy Grail of the comprehensive permit stat-
ute—ten percent of the housing stock being affordable—would not 
provide protection against new comprehensive permit projects. In 
Boothroyd v. Zoning Board of Appeals of Amherst, the Court held that 
achieving the Holy Grail is not quite enough.75 Cities and towns must 
consider the regional need for affordable housing, even where the 
local needs are satisfied—i.e., the ten percent quota is reached.76 
 The holding in Boothroyd is further complicated by the courts’ 
prior decisions making clear that a comprehensive permit applicant is 
without appeal to the Housing Appeals Committee in cities or towns 
that are consistent with local needs.77 These holdings explicitly suggest 
to municipalities that once the goal has been achieved, neighborhoods 
can thereafter be protected from the ruleless process that defines the 
statute. 
 The SJC reiterated that chapter 40B was a “particularized solu-
tion,” crafted by the Massachusetts Legislature to address its concern 
that cities and towns would use their zoning powers to exclude low- 
and moderate-income groups.78 The Legislature was concerned “with 
ensuring that every city and town in the Commonwealth [had] avail-
able a certain minimum amount of affordable housing stock.”79 Chap-
                                                                                                                      
74 See Boothroyd v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Amherst, 868 N.E.2d 83, 88–89 (Mass. 
2007). 
75 Id. This fact highlights the regressive and absurd impact of the statute. Progressive 
cities and towns, theoretically, will achieve the state’s mandate while “snob” communities 
will not. Is it the abutter’s fault, as in the case of Standerwick, that the town’s leadership and 
legislative body consists of snobs? Even if the abutter is not a snob herself, she suffers the 
consequences and is without options. Other than simply accepting her fate, the abutter’s 
other choice is to move to a nonsnob community, leaving the community of snobs behind. 
As discussed in this Part, however, the nonsnob community is responsible for the housing 
the snob communities have failed to produce. See id. Simply put, the abutter can find no 
safe harbor from the ravages of the comprehensive permit statute, regardless of where she 
lives in Massachusetts. 
76 Id. 
77 See, e.g., Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Greenfield v. Hous. Appeals Comm., 446 N.E.2d 
748, 750–51 (Mass. App. Ct. 1983) (“[The Housing Appeals Committee] cannot order the 
issuance of a comprehensive permit . . . where the locality has fulfilled its minimum low or 
moderate income housing obligation under one of the criteria set forth in G.L. c. 40B, 
§ 20.”). 
78 Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Wellesley v. Ardemore Apartments Ltd. P’ship, 767 N.E.2d 
584, 592 (Mass. 2002) (citing Bd. of Appeals of Hanover v. Hous. Appeals Comm., 294 
N.E.2d 393, 402–03 (Mass. 1973)). 
79 Id. 
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ter 40B thus “reflects the Legislature’s careful balance between leav-
ing to local authorities their well-recognized autonomy generally to 
establish local zoning requirements, while foreclosing municipalities 
from obstructing the building of a minimum level of [affordable] 
housing.”80 To maintain this “careful balance,” the Legislature en-
acted a scheme in which a city or town’s autonomy may be overruled 
only where the municipality has failed to provide the minimum requirements of 
affordable housing as defined by the statute: 
[C]entral to the legislative scheme is the requirement that an 
override of local zoning authority’s decision to deny an appli-
cation to build affordable housing is available only to the ex-
tent that a city or town has not met its share of affordable 
housing units as delineated in the Act. Once a town has met its 
minimum obligations, local zoning requirements are deemed “consis-
tent with local needs,” and the [Housing Appeals Committee] is with-
out authority to order a local zoning board to issue a comprehensive 
permit. To the extent that a city or town does not have an ade-
quate supply of affordable housing (measured in the Act as a 
percentage of existing housing or of land in each town) its lo-
cal autonomy in zoning matters is curtailed. Once its obligation is 
met, the override power delegated to the [Committee] is extinguished.81 
 This statutory scheme—in which a municipality satisfying certain 
minimum affordable housing requirements retains authority to deny or 
condition comprehensive permits—arguably realizes and affects chap-
ter 40B’s multiple goals. Chapter 40B is concerned not only with the 
creation of affordable housing, but also with a municipality’s particular-
ized planning responsibilities: “the need to protect the health or safety 
of the occupants of the proposed housing or of the residents of the city 
or town, to promote better site and building design in relation to the 
surroundings, or to preserve open spaces.”82 
 The SJC has noted that “the interest in the provision of critically 
needed affordable housing must be balanced against the statutorily 
authorized interests in the protection of the safety and health of the 
                                                                                                                      
80 Id. at 592–93 (footnote omitted) (citation omitted). 
81 Id. at 593 (citations omitted) (emphasis added); see Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Greenfield, 
446 N.E.2d at 750–51. 
82 Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 40B, § 20 (2006). 
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town’s residents, development of improved site and building design, 
and preservation of open space.”83 
 Note, however, that while the comprehensive permit applicant is 
without appeal to the Housing Appeals Committee, being consistent 
with local needs does little to protect the community from the contin-
ued anarchy imposed by the statute. Moreover, the holding in Boothroyd 
defeats one of the very incentives of the statute—the development of 
affordable housing in accordance with a long-range plan.84 
 Allowing—or perhaps ensuring85—that cities and towns continually 
approve comprehensive permits may be pragmatically important given 
that achieving the “consistent with local need” standard is fleeting. Once 
obtained it is easily and promptly lost as each market-rate dwelling unit 
approved puts the community further behind in its quota. Left open for 
analysis is the equity to the abutters of future comprehensive permit 
projects. 
 These abutters—and we are all abutters—should be able to rely on 
their community’s achievement of the statutory Holy Grail, thereby 
turning to zoning and other locally adopted land-use controls to guide 
the community’s future, but they cannot. The abutter to open lands, 
built-upon lands, or underutilized lands has no knowledge of what will 
occur on the property next door. This is a perplexing result given the 
SJC’s holding in Vazza v. Board of Appeals of Brockton.86 
 As discussed below, it cannot be fairly argued that the statute 
merely reinforces home rule, that is, that boards of appeals are simply 
exercising their authority pursuant to local concerns.87 First, the statute 
mandates compliance with the comprehensive permit formulas. Com-
pliance with these formulas could hardly be labeled as an exercise of 
home rule authority. Worse, the statute allows a board of appeals to 
                                                                                                                      
83 Standerwick v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Andover, 849 N.E.2d 197, 206 (Mass. 2006); 
see also Bd. of Appeals of Hanover, 294 N.E.2d at 413. 
84 Bd. of Appeals of Hanover, 294 N.E.2d at 413 (noting the alternative definitions of 
consistency with local needs in chapter 40B, section 20 “define precisely the municipality’s 
minimum housing obligations ‘under the statute and permit it to do some intelligent, 
long-range planning about how and where the necessary housing shall be built’” (quoting 
Allan G. Rodgers, Snob Zoning in Massachusetts, 1970 Ann. Surv. of Mass. L. 487, 490)). 
85 Boothroyd v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Amherst, 868 N.E.2d 83, 89 (Mass. 2007) (“A 
municipality’s attainment of its minimum affordable housing obligation in many cases 
does not eliminate the need for affordable housing within its borders. . . . Application of 
the regional needs test, however, ensures that local boards of appeal will balance the com-
peting considerations involved.”). 
86 See discussion supra note 64. 
87 See Witten, supra note 19, at 521. The Massachusetts Constitution contains a home 
rule amendment. Mass. Const. amend. art. II, §§ 1–9. 
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continually grant comprehensive permit approvals without any stan-
dards, guidelines, or rational objectives, except for the production of 
new housing units. Lastly, and unfortunately, members of the board of 
appeals, dutifully complying with the statute’s endless requirement to 
become consistent with local needs and remain compliant, are under 
relentless pressure to continue to approve comprehensive permit pro-
jects.88 
 Following Boothroyd and Standerwick, the plight of Ms. Standerwick 
and countless other abutters throughout the state has become more 
tenuous when the town is consistent with local needs. Ms. Standerwick 
cannot raise property devaluation as grounds to appeal the issuance of 
a comprehensive permit notwithstanding that the town has met its 
statutory obligations. Second, and worse yet, Ms. Standerwick is now 
responsible to ensure satisfaction of an undefined and undefinable re-
gional housing need. At least where the community was not consistent 
with local needs, the measurement of inconsistency was the municipal-
ity itself. Post-Standerwick, the SJC has introduced a new and utterly un-
attainable standard. 
 Neither the Boothroyd court nor the statute provides guidance as to 
how to measure the regional need for affordable housing. Given the 
SJC’s deference to the Housing Appeals Committee in the Committee’s 
interpretation of its own regulations, it cannot be reasonably predicted 
how far the Committee will go in defining regional housing needs. But, 
if past practice is any guide, the Housing Appeals Committee will go far 
to ensure that the ends trump the means, and regional housing needs 
will be broadly and grossly interpreted. For example, will Ms. Stander-
wick and her neighbors be responsible for the regional housing needs 
of Andover and its neighboring communities, the Boston metropolitan 
area, eastern Massachusetts, or the entire Commonwealth? A cynic 
might even suggest that it is not beyond the Housing Appeals Commit-
                                                                                                                      
88 Psychologist Stanley Milgram wrote: 
 The essence of obedience is that a person comes to view himself as the in-
strument for carrying out another person’s wishes, and he therefore no longer 
regards himself as responsible for the actions. Once this critical shift of view-
point has occurred, all of the essential features of obedience follow. . . . 
 . . . . 
 . . . This may illustrate a dangerously typical arrangement in a complex so-
ciety: it is easy to ignore responsibility when one is only an intermediate link 
in a chain of actions. 
Stanley Milgram, The Perils of Obedience, Harper’s Magazine, Dec. 1973, at 62. 
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tee to define the Commonwealth’s regional housing needs as including 
the five additional states in the New England region.89 
 In a state that has all but abolished regional governments,90 the 
SJC’s reference to regional consideration is unfortunately analogous to 
the plight of greyhounds chasing the dog track’s mechanical rabbit. 
While the greyhound is led to believe it can catch the rabbit, and it 
never does, in a similarly deceptive fashion, municipalities and their 
residents have been led to believe that they can achieve the ten percent 
threshold and the race will be over.91 
III. The Repeal of Chapter 40B, Sections 20 to 23 
 The comprehensive permit statute cannot be reformed; it must be 
repealed.92 Reformation efforts, like rearranging deck chairs on the 
                                                                                                                      
89 As the Commonwealth’s cities and towns have all but achieved the Legislature’s 
purported goal of ten percent subsidized housing when viewed statewide, the Housing 
Appeals Committee would need to look beyond the state’s borders to argue that the re-
gional need for subsidized housing outweighs the abolition of local land-use controls. The 
total number of housing units in the Commonwealth is 2,526,963 and the number of 
dwelling units that count is 241,630. See SHI, supra note 23. Accordingly, 9.6% of the 
Commonwealth’s housing stock meets DHCD’s arbitrary definition of affordable. Id. 
90 Citizen Information Service, Historical Data Relating to the Incorporation and 
Abolishment of Counties in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, http://www.sec.state. 
ma.us/cis/cisctlist/ctlistcounin.htm (last visited Mar. 27, 2008) (noting the county gov-
ernments were abolished in the counties of Franklin, Middlesex, Hampden, Worcester, 
Hampshire, Essex, Berkshire, and Suffolk between 1996 and 2000). Two notable excep-
tions: county governments remain on Martha’s Vineyard and Cape Cod. Cape Cod Com-
mission Act, 1989 Mass. Acts 716; Martha’s Vineyard Commission Act, 1977 Mass. Acts 831. 
91 Boothroyd v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Amherst, 868 N.E.2d 83, 89 (Mass. 2007) 
(“Finally, our conclusion does not ‘needlessly infringe[]’ on the ‘settled property rights of 
abutters.’ Rather, our conclusion takes into account that the Legislature ‘has clearly de-
lineated that point where local interests must yield to the general public need for hous-
ing.’” (quoting Bd. of Appeals of Hanover v. Hous. Appeals Comm., 294 N.E.2d 393, 423 
(Mass. 1973))). Under the existing statutory scheme, the municipality will never be in 
compliance. 
92 Not satisfied with the damage wrought by the comprehensive permit statute, the leg-
islature adopted several “smart growth” laws in 2005 and 2006. See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 
40R (2006); Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 40S (2006). A critique of these laws is beyond the scope 
of this Article, except to add that none of the Commonwealth’s regulatory efforts to in-
crease density through “smart growth” or “transit-oriented developments” contain recipro-
cal offsets for the preservation of open space elsewhere in the Commonwealth. See Mass. 
Gen. Laws ch. 40R; Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 40S. While it may seem smart to intensify the 
densities of existing neighborhoods by granting developers “streamlined permitting pro-
cedures,” as described in Massachusetts General Law chapter 43D, there is nothing smart 
about quadrupling densities in one neighborhood without requiring the beneficiary de-
veloper to protect development rights elsewhere in the community or region. See Mass. 
Gen. Laws ch. 40R; Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 40S; Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 43D (2006). These 
laws permit a city or town lawfully to adopt spot zoning districts that, thereafter, are under 
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Titanic prior to its sinking, will do little to promote affordable housing 
and protect due process principles. What portions of the statute can be 
reformed? Reduce the ten percent goal?93 Require “Adult Supervision” 
by state agencies?94 Establish maximum densities?95 Prohibit commer-
cial development within a comprehensive permit application?96 Ensure 
that abutters have the right of appeal consistent with normative land-
use practices?97 Delete the limited dividend organization as a viable ap-
                                                                                                                      
the control of the DHCD. The districts allow for high-density development as a premise for 
creating smart growth but neither promise nor are capable of delivering a corresponding 
off-set of land preserved elsewhere in the community—or the Commonwealth—in ex-
change for the densities allowed in the smart growth district. 
One author wrote of people living on the Gulf Coast after Hurricane Katrina: 
There are, for example, several thousand Vietnamese in Biloxi: they came to 
work on the shrimp boats and stayed to build houses and raise families. Ac-
cording to Uyen Le, who works for a Vietnamese community organization, 
many of them left behind a world where only poor people walk everywhere 
and a car is a sign of success. “That’s the American dream: you get your own 
lot, and you get your own little house, and you get your own car,” she ex-
plained. “And now you’re talking about these walkable neighborhoods, and 
some people will say, ‘I came to America so I could drive.’” Some of these 
New Urbanist ideas don’t really match up for this area. 
Jim Lewis, Battle for Biloxi, N.Y. Times Mag., May 21, 2006, available at 2006 WLNR 8713505; 
see also William W. Buzbee, Sprawl’s Political-Economy and the Case for a Metropolitan Green 
Space Initiative, 32 Urb. Law. 367, 383–89 (2000) (arguing for reinvestment in urban open 
space as a means to offset sprawl); Michael Neuman, The Compact City Fallacy, 25 J. of Plan. 
Educ. & Res. 11, 23 (2005) (arguing that reducing urban sprawl by creating compact cities 
may not be sustainable and that city “standing alone” is not sustainable); Barbara Melamed 
Huggins, Wrong Again: Massachusetts’s Affordable Housing Statute and Smart Growth 
Zoning (May 2005) (unpublished Master’s thesis, Tufts University Department of Urban 
and Environmental Policy and Planning) (on file with author). 
93 For example, the Legislature could establish a lower threshold, such as five percent 
of the housing units in the community must be subsidized. 
94 See Testimony of Massachusetts Inspector General Gregory Sullivan on October 23, 
2007 Dealing with Rampant Financial Abuses and Alleged Criminal Activity Regarding Im-
plementation of the State’s Chapter 40B “Affordable Housing” Statute, http://www.navlog. 
org/ma_ig_40b.pdf [hereinafter Testimony]. For example, empower cities and towns to 
oversee the entire comprehensive permit process and remove any responsibilities from 
DHCD and MassHousing. 
95 For example, the Legislature could allow a maximum density of no greater than two 
times the underlying zoning within the locus on which the project is proposed. 
96 For example, the Legislature could prohibit such mixed uses without local legislative 
zoning approval. Unless the local legislative body desires to site nonresidential uses within 
a comprehensive permit project and adopts zoning that affirmatively permits the same, the 
authority to destroy existing neighborhoods cannot be delegated to the board of appeals 
and, thereafter, the Housing Appeals Committee. 
97 For example, the Legislature could affirmatively reverse the holding of Standerwick v. 
Zoning Board of Appeals of Andover by legislative enactment. See 849 N.E.2d 197, 210–11 
(Mass. 2006). 
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plicant?98 While each of the above assurances would make the statute 
more equitable, they do nothing to fix its core flaw: the complete lack 
of integration among municipal competing interests and critical con-
cerns. Only by combining these core, competing, and critical concerns 
into a comprehensive document—a plan—can the statute’s fatal flaws 
be resolved. 
 In recognition that the statute is irreparably flawed, ten citizens of 
the Commonwealth filed a petition in the summer of 2007 with the 
Massachusetts Attorney General seeking to repeal the statute.99 Al-
though the petition was certified by the Massachusetts Attorney Gen-
eral, and over 70,000 signatures were obtained,100 the Secretary of State 
refused to certify over half of the signatures due to stray marks found 
on the petition.101 Upon resubmission of the petition in 2009, it is an-
ticipated that the numerous organizations represented by counsel (40B 
advocates)102 that fought the Attorney General’s certification will, once 
again, restate their argument that repeal of the statute will constitute a 
regulatory taking and, therefore, will violate the Massachusetts Consti-
tution.103 They argue, incorrectly, that the initiative petition violated 
                                                                                                                      
98 For example, the Legislature could remove the for-profit developer as a qualified 
entity that may apply for a comprehensive permit. 
99 Initiative Petition for a Law Relative to Comprehensive Permits and Regional Plan-
ning, No. 07-02, July 30, 2007, available at http://www.mass.gov/Cago/docs/Government/ 
petition07-02.rtf [hereinafter Initiative Petition]. 
100 66,593 signatures were required. See Initiative Petition Process, 2007–2008, 
http://www.mass.gov (search for “Initiative Petition Process, 2007–2008”) (last visited Mar. 
27, 2008). 
101 Moving Massachusetts Forward, http://www.repeal40b.com/press2.htm (last visited 
Mar. 27, 2008). 
102 Ten organizations, including the DHCD, MassHousing, Massachusetts Housing 
Partnership, Citizens’ Housing and Planning Association, and the Affordable Housing 
Committee of the Real Estate Bar Association, filed arguments with the Massachusetts At-
torney General’s office in opposition to the initiative petition. Letter from Peter Sacks, 
Deputy Chief, Gov’t Bureau, Office of the Attorney Gen., to Deborah Goddard, Gen. 
Counsel, Dept. of Hous. and Comm. Dev., Michael Rabieh, Goulston & Storrs, and Kurt A. 
James and Theodore C. Regante, Affordable Hous. Comm. (Sept. 6, 2007) (on file with 
author) (certifying the initiative petition). 
103 See Mass. Const. amend. art. 48, § 2. Article 48, section 2 of the Massachusetts 
Constitution prohibits an initiative petition from including the following: 
No measure that relates to religion, religious practices or religious institu-
tions; or to the appointment, qualification, tenure, removal, recall or com-
pensation of judges; or to the reversal of a judicial decision; or to the powers, 
creation or abolition of courts; or the operation of which is restricted to a 
particular town, city or other political division or to particular districts or lo-
calities of the commonwealth; or that makes a specific appropriation of 
money from the treasury of the commonwealth, shall be proposed by an ini-
tiative petition; but if a law approved by the people is not repealed, the gen-
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Article 48 of the Massachusetts Constitution as it would affect a taking 
of property without compensation to comprehensive permit holders 
who do not obtain building permits as of January 1, 2009.104 
 While the Attorney General rejected the 40B advocates’ position 
and certified the initiative petition,105 it is anticipated that the 40B ad-
vocates would appeal any recertification by the Attorney General. The 
SJC should reject any such challenge to the initiative petition. 
A. A Regulatory Taking Is Well-Defined: The Petition Does Not  
Constitute a Regulatory Taking 
 A regulatory taking resulting from a government’s legislative ac-
tion does not occur unless: (1) the legislation results in a permanent 
physical occupation of private property,106 and/or (2) the legislative 
action leaves a landowner with no reasonable economic value or use.107 
                                                                                                                      
eral court shall raise by taxation or otherwise and shall appropriate such 
money as may be necessary to carry such law into effect. 
Id. 
104 The initiative petition states: 
Be it enacted by the People, and by their authority: 
SECTION 1: Chapter 40B, sections 20 through 23, inclusive of the General 
Laws are hereby repealed. 
SECTION 2: No provision of this act shall be interpreted as applying to, affecting, 
amending, or otherwise impairing the provisions of any project approved by a board of 
appeals or the Housing Appeals Committee pursuant to G.L. c.40B, s.20–23 before the 
effective date of this Act, provided that said project has been issued a building permit 
pursuant to the State Building Code for at least one (1) dwelling unit. 
SECTION 3: The provisions of this act are severable, and if any provision of 
this act is found to be unconstitutional, contrary to law, or otherwise invalid 
by a court of competent jurisdiction, then the other provisions of this act shall 
continue to be in effect. 
SECTION 4: This act shall take effect January 1, 2009. 
Initiative Petition, supra note 99 (emphasis added) (formatting omitted). 
105 See Letter from Peter Sacks, supra note 102. 
106 Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 421 (1982). The de-
termination of whether government’s actions constitute a regulatory taking where adjudi-
cative decisions are under review, which is not the case here—e.g., those where the land-
owner claims that government has worked a regulatory taking by imposing unreasonable 
conditions as a quid pro quo for the grant of a special permit or variance—are governed 
by the “nexus” and “proportionality” tests established by the Supreme Court in a long line 
of cases and commentary including Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825 
(1987), and Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994). 
107 E.g., Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Comm’n, 505 U.S. 1003, 1017 (1992); Pa. Cent. Trans. 
Co. v. City of N.Y., 438 U.S. 104, 130–31 (1978); U.S. Gypsum Co. v. Executive Office of 
Envtl. Affairs, 867 N.E.2d 764, 776–77 (Mass. App. Ct. 2007); Zanghi v. Bd. of Appeals of 
Bedford, 807 N.E.2d 221, 224 (Mass. App. Ct. 2004). 
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 A regulatory taking has been held to have occurred where the 
government’s actions result in a permanent physical occupation of pri-
vate property.108 The 40B advocates did not suggest that the initiative 
petition would result in the permanent physical occupation of private 
property. Thus the first possible prong of a regulatory takings analysis is 
not implicated by the petition. 
 The 40B advocates do argue, however, the second possible prong 
of regulatory takings analysis that the initiative petition would result in 
a taking with respect to comprehensive permit holders who did not ob-
tain building permits by the effective date of January 1, 2009. A regula-
tory taking does not exist unless it effectively deprives the landowner of 
all economically beneficial or viable use of the land.109 To establish a 
regulatory taking, the 40B advocates must demonstrate that the repeal 
of the statute leaves the property “‘economically idle’” and that the 
plaintiff retains no more than a “token” interest.”110 
 The loss of one property interest among a bundle of property rights 
does not, alone, constitute a taking, even if that one property right, and 
the economic value associated with it, is completely eliminated.111 This 
principle is often referred to as the “whole parcel doctrine.”112 More-
over, the fact that the challenged regulation was enacted after the land-
owner’s acquisition of the property does not alter the outcome.113 
                                                                                                                      
108 Lorretto, 458 U.S. at 421. 
109 E.g., Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1017; U.S. Gypsum Co., 867 N.E.2d at 776–77; Zanghi, 807 
N.E.2d at 224. 
110 E.g., Gove v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Chatham, 831 N.E.2d 865, 872 (Mass. 2005) 
(quoting Palazzollo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 631 (2001)). 
111 See Pa. Cent., 438 U.S. at 130–31. 
112 See, e.g., Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 
327 (2002); Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65–66 (1979) (“[T]he destruction of one 
‘strand’ of the bundle [of property rights] is not a taking, because the aggregate must be 
viewed in its entirety.”). 
113 See Gove, 831 N.E.2d at 867 (deciding a bylaw prohibiting construction of a single-
family house on lot in a flood plain was not a regulatory taking, even though owner had 
acquired the lot years prior to the adoption of the bylaw); Long Cove Club Assocs. v. Town 
of Hilton Head Island, 458 S.E.2d 757, 758 (S.C. 1995) (noting rezoning that nullified pre-
existing “Development Permit” did not constitute a taking); Flynn v. City of Cambridge, 
418 N.E.2d 335, 339–40 (Mass. 1981) (concluding that adoption of a condominium con-
version ordinance was not a taking, even as to owners whose units were purchased prior to 
the effective date of the ordinance). 
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B. Chapter 40B Creates No Vested Rights 
 The 40B advocates argue that the issuance of a comprehensive 
permit endows the holder with certain vested rights or vested property inter-
ests equivalent to those created under chapter 40A.114 
 The vested rights referenced—such as those pertaining to special 
permits and subdivision plans—are creatures of statute.115 That is, they 
are defined by statute, and their protections afforded only to those spe-
cific circumstances described in the statute.116 There exists no compa-
rable language in any section of chapter 40B creating a vested right in 
an issued comprehensive permit. Absent specific language establishing 
such rights under chapter 40B, none can be inferred. Expressio unius est 
exclusion alterius.117 
 Moreover, the Commonwealth’s appellate courts have made it 
abundantly clear that protections created under chapter 40A cannot be 
imported into chapter 40B, where chapter 40B does not contain the 
specific language creating such protections.118 
 Had the Legislature intended to provide comprehensive permit 
recipients with the vested rights enumerated under chapter 40A, it 
would have done so—either in the original enactment of chapter 40B 
or by amendment. The Legislature is “‘presumed to understand and 
intend all consequences’ of its acts,”119 and “to be aware of existing 
                                                                                                                      
114 See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 40A, § 6 (2006). 
115 See id. 
116 See id. (enumerating specifically zoning protection for: (1) building or uses “law-
fully in existence or lawfully begun”; (2) special permits issued prior to an advertisement 
for a zoning change; (3) undersized lots of “at least five thousand square feet of area and 
fifty feet of frontage”; (4) up to three undersized lots held in common ownership of “at 
least seven thousand five hundred square feet of area and seventy-five feet of frontage”; (5) 
preliminary subdivision plans of land; (6) definitive subdivision plans of land; and (7) use 
freezes for approval not required plans). 
117 Bagley v. Illyrian Gardens, Inc., 519 N.E.2d 1308, 1310 (Mass. 1988). 
118 See, e.g., Planning Bd. of Hingham v. Hingham Campus, LLC, 780 N.E.2d 902, 905 
(Mass. 2003) (deciding it was “improper” to consider standing under chapter 40A where 
the permit issued under chapter 40B); Cardwell v. Bd. of Appeals of Woburn, 807 N.E.2d 
207, 210–11 (Mass. App. Ct. 2004) (emphasizing that provision for constructive approval 
found in chapter 40A cannot be imported into chapter 40B); see also Standerwick v. Zoning 
Bd. of Appeals of Andover, 849 N.E.2d 197, 204, 210–11 (Mass. 2006) (noting “interests 
protected by G.L. c. 40B differ from, and in some respects are inconsistent with, those 
protected by G.L. c. 40A,” including the remarkable holding that standing claims differ 
with respect to 40A and 40B projects). 
119 See Boston Water & Sewer Comm’n v. Metropolitan Dist. Comm’n, 562 N.E.2d 470, 
474 (Mass. 1990) (quoting Rambert v. Commonwealth, 452 N.E.2d 222, 224 (Mass. 1983)). 
2008] Revising Massachusetts's Affordable Housing and Anti-Snob Zoning 249 
statutes when it amends a statute or enacts a new one.”120 Although the 
40B advocates suggest that the provisions of chapter 40A apply by anal-
ogy to chapter 40B—or that they provide a parallel to chapter 40B—the 
courts have held otherwise. 
 Further support for the argument that possession of a compre-
hensive permit does not constitute a vested right is found throughout 
decisions of the Housing Appeals Committee. First, as the Committee 
has repeatedly held that “the comprehensive permit itself is prelimi-
nary,” the permit is based solely on preliminary drawings and plans.121 
 Second, a comprehensive permit: (1) as required by 760 Mass. 
Code Regs. 56.07(5)(b), may not permit “the building or operation of 
housing . . . less safe than the applicable building and site plan re-
quirements of the subsidizing agency”;122 (2) as required by 760 Mass. 
Code Regs. 56.04(7), necessitates approval from the “designated en-
tity that issued the Project Eligibility . . . determination”;123 and (3) as 
required by chapter 40B, section 20, 760 Mass. Code Regs. 56.04(1)(b) 
cannot be used and is not effective without the issuance of a federal 
                                                                                                                      
120 See Mulhern v. MacLeod, 808 N.E.2d 778, 782 (Mass. 2004) (quoting Common-
wealth v. Russ R., 744 N.E.2d 39, 43 (Mass. 2001)). 
121 E.g., Oxford Hous. Auth., No. 90-12, slip op. at 4 (Mass. Housing Appeals Commit-
tee Nov. 18, 1991) (involving the Oxford Zoning Board of Appeals). The Housing Appeals 
Committee stated: 
The adequacy of the design work done by a developer, which is normally re-
flected in architectural or engineering plans, is frequently questioned before 
this Committee. Since this sort of challenge is often based on a misunder-
standing of the requirements under our regulations, we will describe the 
scheme envisioned by the statute and regulations in some detail, in the hope 
of laying this issue to rest. 
 Beginning with its earliest cases, the Committee has made it clear that 
plans submitted for comprehensive permit approval are preliminary . . . . The 
rationale for this rule is that the comprehensive permit itself is preliminary in 
the sense that no construction can proceed until a building permit has been 
issued. The building permit is not issued until the appropriate officials have 
reviewed final construction drawings and insured that the project will comply 
with various state codes and all local requirements not waived by the compre-
hensive permit. 
Id. at 3–4 (footnote omitted); see also Marion v. Mass. Hous. Fin. Agency, 861 N.E.2d 468, 
471 (Mass. App. Ct. 2007) (holding that the issuance of a Project Eligibility letter, the only 
method of complying with former Massachusetts Code Regulations 31.01(1)(b), “is merely 
an interim step in the administrative process”); 760 Mass. Code Regs. 56.04(2) (2008) 
(formerly 760 Mass. Code Regs. 31.02 (2007)) (describing filing requirements for com-
prehensive permit applicants and emphasizing the nominal and preliminary requirements 
for filing, including preliminary plans and drawings). 
122 760 Mass. Code Regs. 56.07(5)(b). 
123 Id. at 56.04(7). 
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or state subsidy to the developer.124 Many federal or state subsidies, 
such as the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit program,125 are highly 
competitive and available to only a limited pool of applicants and only 
during a limited period each calendar year. 
 Third, a comprehensive permit expires by its own terms if con-
struction authorized by the comprehensive permit has not begun by 
the date set by the local board of appeals or Housing Appeals Commit-
tee.126 
 Receipt of a comprehensive permit cannot be said to create, 
categorically, vested rights. The statute and the applicable regulations 
impose nominal filing requirements, subject the applicant to numer-
ous and discretionary conditions imposed subsequent to receipt of the 
comprehensive permit, and leave the recipient subject to the unbri-
dled authority of the subsidizing agency to grant a required subsidy 
and the local board of appeals to place any expiration date it chooses 
on a comprehensive permit. 
C. The Ad Hoc, Fact-Based Inquiry Entailed in Regulatory Takings Analysis 
Is Beyond the Scope of the Attorney General and SJC’s  
Review of the Initiative Petition 
 In Yankee Atomic Electric Co. v. Secretary of the Commonwealth (Yankee 
Two), the SJC considered the question of whether the Attorney Gen-
eral had correctly certified an initiative petition seeking to prohibit 
generation of electric power by commercial nuclear power plants in 
Massachusetts.127 The Attorney General’s certification of the petition 
had been challenged by the two nuclear power plant companies then 
operating in Massachusetts, that argued that the petition would effect 
a regulatory taking and would violate Article 48 of the Massachusetts 
Constitution.128 The SJC had issued a decision previously on this case 
(Yankee One), ordering the Attorney General to conduct a limited ex-
                                                                                                                      
124 Town of Middleborough v. Hous. Appeals Comm., 870 N.E.2d 67, 74 (Mass. 2007) 
(discussing the subsidy requirement of the statute). 
125 See 760 Mass. Code Regs. 54.01–.16 (2000). 
126 See id. at 56.05(12)(c); see also Forestview Estates Assocs., Inc., No. 05-23, slip op. at 
7–8 (Mass. Housing Appeals Committee Mar. 5, 2007) (concluding that a comprehensive 
permit lapsed pursuant to 760 Mass. Code Regs. 31.08(4), now 760 Mass. Code Regs. 
56.05(12)(c), where the holder did not seek an extension of the permit prior to it lapsing) 
(involving the Douglas Board of Appeals). 
127 Yankee Atomic Electric Co. v. Secretary of the Commonwealth (Yankee Two), 526 N.E.2d 
1246, 1247 (Mass. 1988). 
128 Id. 
2008] Revising Massachusetts's Affordable Housing and Anti-Snob Zoning 251 
amination of the facts relating to the initiative petition.129 The Attor-
ney General did so and affirmed his certification, concluding “that 
the petition [did] not establish, on its face, that it effects a regulatory 
taking.”130 In upholding the certification, the SJC held that due to the 
ad hoc and fact-dependent nature of regulatory takings analysis, the 
Attorney General’s inquiry was to be limited.131 
 Yankee Two is highly instructive, if not dispositive of the initiative 
petition to repeal chapter 40B. As with the petition in Yankee Two, the 
initiative petition proposes “not a permanent physical occupation or 
confiscation of property, but instead a regulation of use of property,” 
and “[a]s such the question is whether the ‘regulation goes too far.’”132 
As the SJC noted, answering the question of whether a regulation “goes 
too far” involves regulatory takings analysis which is “peculiarly fact de-
pendent, involving ‘essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries.’”133 Under Yan-
kee Two, the issues in the initiative petition—whether the potential nulli-
fication of a comprehensive permit “goes too far,” and thus whether a 
taking of property will occur— “will involve the kind of lengthy factual 
determination which [Article] 48 does not require or allow to the At-
torney General at this time.”134 
                                                                                                                      
129 Yankee Atomic Elec. Co. v. Sec’y of the Commonwealth (Yankee One), 525 N.E.2d 
369, 375 (Mass. 1988). 
130 Yankee Two, 526 N.E.2d at 1248. 
131 Id. at 1249–50. 
 Our review . . . reveals issues (1) which are relevant to the question 
whether a taking would ensue from the proposed legislation, and (2) which 
have not been, and should not be, determined through the Attorney Gen-
eral’s limited examination of the facts at this time. The petition proposes not 
a permanent physical occupation or confiscation of property, but instead a 
regulation of use of property. As such the question is whether the “regulation 
goes too far.” Answering this question involves regulatory takings analysis 
which is peculiarly fact dependent, involving “essentially ad hoc, factual in-
quiries.” We conclude that at least some of the relevant inquiries which may 
arise in the ultimate determination whether a taking of property has oc-
curred will involve the kind of lengthy factual determination which art. 48 
does not require or allow to the Attorney General at this time. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
132 Id. (citation omitted) (quoting Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922)). 
133 Id. (quoting Pa. Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of N.Y., 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978)). 
134 Id. 
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IV. After Chapter 40B, Sections 20 to 23: A Recipe for Building 
Affordable Housing in Massachusetts 
 The comprehensive permit statute relies on tired and worn innu-
endo—opponents of 40B projects are “NIMBYs” and “snobs” —and has 
been driven for thirty-eight years by real estate developers and others 
who have long fed at the “pig fest,” as described by the Common-
wealth’s Inspector General.135 The statute is punitive; it obliterates all 
local land-use, fiscal, and planning control; it ignores the countless 
other critical issues facing cities and towns today; and it imposes a one-
size-fits-all policy that insults the distinctions between Cape Cod and 
Cape Ann, the Berkshires and the Blackstone Valley. 
 Although cloaked in unassailable objectives, such as assisting re-
turning Vietnam veterans find housing,136 the statute remains a per-
verse attempt to cram city-like densities, building types, and large-scale 
infrastructure into suburban and rural towns. It has no roots in sound 
land-use planning principles, no counterpart anywhere else in the na-
tion, and results in the destruction of neighborhoods, marginal lands, 
                                                                                                                      
135 Christine McConville, Profits Probed in Housing Program, Boston Globe, Oct. 10, 
2006, at A1. The Inspector General’s “pig fest” remarks signaled the beginnings of a thor-
ough investigation into the imbedded corruption of the comprehensive permit process. Id. 
Most recently, in testimony before a Massachusetts Senate and House Joint Committee on 
Housing, Inspector General Gregory W. Sullivan stated, “This 40B scandal represents one 
of the biggest abuses in state history, in my opinion, in terms of dollars and lack of over-
sight. Now we have new people in charge under the administration. We’re calling for Adult 
Supervision to come in and rectify these problems.” Testimony, supra note 94; see also Let-
ter from Gregory W. Sullivan, Inspector Gen., to Susan Tucker, Senate Chair, Joint Comm. 
on Hous., and Kevin Honan, House Chair, Joint Comm. on Hous. (Oct. 23, 2007), available 
at http://www.mass.gov/ig/publ/40b_hearing_letter.pdf. 
136 Currently, the regulations state that the avowed purpose is to “reduce regulatory bar-
riers that impede development of such housing.” 760 Mass. Code Regs. 56.01. The goal of 
“reduc[ing] regulatory barriers” curiously comports with the mission statement and goals of 
the development community and their agents, perhaps explaining why the DHCD is deri-
sively referred to as the “Department of Housing and its Community of Developers.” See Ava-
lonBay Communities, Inc., Community Profile, http://www.avalonbay.com/Template.cfm? 
Section=CompanyProfile (last visited Mar. 27, 2008) (“AvalonBay Communities, Inc. is in the 
business of developing, redeveloping, acquiring and managing high-quality apartment com-
munities in the high barrier-to-entry markets of the United States.”); see also NAHB, National 
Association of Home Builders, Barriers to Affordable Housing, http://www.nahb.org/gen- 
eric.aspx?genericContentID=3516 (last visited March 27, 2008) (“Overcoming obstacles such 
as outdated and overly restrictive zoning, and inadequate infrastructure, tax issues, and land 
availability need to be addressed.”); NGA Ctr. for Best Practices, Issue Brief, Integrat-
ing Affordable Housing with State Development Policy, http://www.nga.org/cda/ 
files/0411AFFORDABLEHOUSING.pdf (last visited March 27, 2008) (“[Chapter 40B, sec-
tions 20 to 23] aim[] to encourage the development of affordable housing by reducing the 
barriers created by local approval processes, local zoning, and other restrictions.”). 
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and any rational reason for why local residents would ever again attend 
town or city council meetings to adopt or support land-use regulations. 
 It is not disputed that chapter 40B results in the construction of 
new housing. But at what cost? The Commonwealth could have safer 
roads and cleaner water if the income tax rate were doubled, but it is 
doubtful that such action would be tolerated. The ends do not justify 
the means in a democratic society, yet 40B remains the ultimate ends 
versus means legislation—but not for long. 
 The answer to what is next is easy. Massachusetts must join with 
the numerous other states that have adopted comprehensive land-use 
planning legislation that enables cities and towns to impose, among 
other things, inclusionary zoning requirements and to collect impact 
fees.137 States as diverse as California,138 Maryland,139 and Rhode Is-
land140 build more affordable housing units than Massachusetts 
through burden sharing between the developer and the commu-
nity.141 Unlike chapter 40B—which is nothing more than a gift of tax-
payer dollars to private developers—inclusionary zoning, impact fees, 
                                                                                                                      
137 See Witten, supra note 19, at 546–51. 
138 See generally Cal. Coal. for Rural Hous., Non-Profit Hous. Ass’n of N. Cal., In-
clusionary Housing in California: 30 Years of Innovation (2003), available at http:// 
www.oaklandnet.com/BlueRibbonCommission/PDFs/BlueRibbon10-NPH.pdf (providing 
a detailed discussion of California’s inclusionary zoning practices). 
139 See Montgomery County, Maryland, Department of Housing & Community Affairs, 
Moderately Priced Dwelling Unit (MPDU) Program in Montgomery County, Maryland, 
http://www.montgomerycountymd.gov/dhctmpl.asp?url=/content/dhca/housing/housi
ng_p/mpdu/Summary_new.asp (last visited Mar. 27, 2008). 
140 R.I. Gen. Laws § 45-22.2-6 (2007) (comprehensive planning rules include a re-
quirement for the planning for and production of affordable housing and penalties for 
failure to produce affordable housing consistent with the plan); R.I. Gen. Laws § 45-53-1 
to -9 (2007) (low- and moderate-income housing). 
141 40B advocates, most notably CHAPA, relentlessly tout the accomplishments of the 
statute. See Citizens’ Housing & Planning Association, supra note 39, at 1 (stating that 
26,000 affordable homes were created since the early 1970s using chapter 40B). In com-
parison, Montgomery County, Maryland’s inclusionary housing ordinance has resulted in 
the creation of over 11,500 affordable dwelling units in the County. Nicholas Brunick, 
Bus. and Prof’l People for the Pub. Interest, The Impact of Inclusionary Zoning 
on Development 6 (2004), available at http://www.bpichicago.org/documents/impact_ 
iz_development.pdf. Brunick writes: 
 In fact, in many communities, development under inclusionary zoning has 
continued so robustly that it has led local officials to consider slowing develop-
ment in the interest of protecting rural and open space. In Loudon County, 
Virginia, the nation’s fourth fastest growing county, the decade-old inclusionary 
zoning program was recently amended because it was producing so much new 
construction that local officials were concerned about its effect on Loudon’s 
shrinking amounts of rural countryside. 
Id. at 6–7. 
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and development agreements require developers to participate in the 
creation of affordable housing, not just profit from it. 
 The repeal of the statute provides an opportunity for the Com-
monwealth to adopt meaningful planning and regulatory provisions 
that require cities and towns to plan for—and build—affordable hous-
ing in a manner that is consistent with local and regional plans. These 
plans will finally incorporate other key municipal concerns into a 
comprehensive plan for the community. Development of housing will 
be a required element of city and town plans, but not the only ele-
ment. Cities and towns will be free to plan for construction of rental 
and for-sale housing, housing for those earning well below eighty per-
cent of the state’s median income, and housing for family members 
within existing dwellings, without fear of retribution from developers 
who are offered a blank check by the Commonwealth’s DHCD. 
V. The Plan 
 An underlying premise of this Article is that the establishment of a 
comprehensive planning process for the Commonwealth’s cities and 
towns, whether it is to promote affordable housing production or con-
venient road systems, should no longer be debated. Academic and pro-
fessional literature is replete with juried discussions highlighting the 
benefits and logic of the preparation by cities and towns of comprehen-
sive plans linking those plans to the regulations designed to make them 
work.142 Lengthy repetition of this process should no longer be neces-
sary. 
A. The Planning Requirement 
 Cities and towns would be required to adopt a comprehensive plan 
within a prescribed period of time—such as three years—following the 
adoption of the planning legislation by the Legislature. The plan would 
be required to include no less than the state-mandated planning ele-
ments—e.g., housing, open space, recreation, public safety, infrastruc-
ture, finance, etc.—and could include optional elements chosen by the 
municipality—such as noise. The plan would be required to identify 
the mechanisms and a timeframe for implementation of the plan’s 
                                                                                                                      
142 See, e.g., 83 Am. Jur. 2d Zoning and Planning § 22 (1992) (legal effect of adopting 
comprehensive plan); Bobrowski, supra note 28; Curtin & Witten, supra note 15; Charles 
M. Haar, In Accordance with a Comprehensive Plan, 68 Harv. L. Rev. 1154 (1955); Sullivan & 
Michel, supra note 16. 
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elements and the minimum requirements set by statute.143 The plan’s 
elements would be required to be horizontally consistent, and, as dis-
cussed below, vertically consistent.144 The plan would be certified by a 
state planning agency for consistency with the state-mandated planning 
elements. The plan would be required to be updated at least every five 
years, but no more often than three times per year.145 
B. Tools for Implementing the Plan 
 Zoning and other land-use controls would be required to be con-
sistent with the plan. Cities and towns would have the authority to 
adopt impact fees,146 transfer development rights,147 enter into devel-
opment agreements,148 and adopt inclusionary zoning149 requirements, 
                                                                                                                      
143 For example, the statute would establish a minimum percentage of land area to be 
set aside in cities and towns for rental housing and/or for-sale housing. Cities and towns 
would be required to produce a specified number of dwelling units for rent or sale to 
those earning specified percentages of median income. Cities and towns would have a 
period of time within which to demonstrate compliance with the statute and the adopted 
plan. Similarly, the statute could establish a minimum percentage of land area to be set 
aside for such uses as recreational opportunities, permanent open space protection, com-
mercial and industrial development. 
144 See infra Part V.B. 
145 See Cal. Gov’t Code § 65,358(b) (West 1997 & Supp. 2008) (limiting the number 
of times the mandatory elements within a comprehensive plan may be revised). 
146 Impact fees allow a municipality to collect fees for the proportionate impact of new 
development. See, e.g., Witten, supra note 19, at 546 n.147. 
147 Transfers of development rights allow a municipality or group of communities to 
authorize the transfer of development rights from one parcel to another, with the trans-
feror parcel being subject to a permanent restriction against additional development. See 
generally Suitum v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 520 U.S. 725 (1997); Fred F. French In-
vesting Co. v. City of New York, 39 N.Y.2d 587; Rick Pruetz & Angela Pruetz, Transfer of 
Development Rights Turns 40, Planning & Envtl. L., June 2007, at 3 (presenting back-
ground information on transfers of development rights and examples of success stories); 
Sarah J. Stevenson, Note, Banking on TDRs: The Government’s Role as Banker of Transferable 
Development Rights, 73 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1329 (1998) (discussing the Suitum case and, specifi-
cally, the role of banks in transfers of development rights). 
148 Development agreements allow a municipality to contract with a land developer for 
public benefits in exchange for granting the developer protection against changes in ap-
plicable land-use regulations. See generally Schwartz, supra note 24 (providing a detailed 
discussion of development agreements). 
149 Inclusionary zoning requires a developer of land to provide affordable housing 
units—rental or sale—or pay fees in lieu of the units as a cost associated with the creation 
of new market-rate units. Unlike the comprehensive permit statute, which is a gift of den-
sity without any reciprocal costs to the developer, inclusionary housing regulations ensure 
that impacts of new market-rate land development are offset by the creation of affordable 
housing units. Inclusionary zoning statutes have been extraordinarily successful through-
out the country. Such statutes have been upheld by appellate courts in various states and, 
perhaps most importantly, produce affordable housing without destroying local plans, 
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such that at least some of the costs of development would be borne by 
the developer and not, as is currently the case, solely by the commu-
nity.150 The zoning act would be revised, holistically, to require vertical 
consistency with adopted plans,151 remove the broad vested rights pro-
visions found within chapter 40A, section 6,152 and ensure judicial def-
erence to municipal land-use decisions consistent with the adopted 
plan and subsequent regulations.153 
C. Penalties for Noncompliance with the Plan 
 Consistent with California’s planning legislation, cities and towns 
that fail to adopt or revise a comprehensive plan consistent with the 
                                                                                                                      
zoning regulations, neighborhoods, and the real property values of homeowners who pur-
chase property with the belief that the zoning ordinances adopted by their legislature are 
intended to protect, not defeat, their investment backed expectations. See generally Cecily T. 
Talbert & Nadia L. Costa, Inclusionary Housing Programs: Local Governments Respond to Cali-
fornia’s Housing Crisis, 30 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 567 (2003) (discussing the conflict be-
tween affordable housing and environmental protection). 
150 See Shelley Ross Saxer, Planning Gain, Extractions, and Impact Fees: A Comparative Study 
of Planning Law in England, Wales, and the United States, 32 Urb. Law. 21, 21–22 (2000) (dis-
cussing strategies in England, Wales, and the United States to force land developers to 
“internalize the externalities” of development impacts). 
151 See Curtin & Witten, supra note 15 at 333. See generally Cal. Gov’t Code 
§ 65,860(a)(2) (West 1997 & Supp. 2008) (requiring that land uses authorized by zoning 
be “compatible” with the objectives of the comprehensive plan); Haines v. City of Phoenix, 
727 P.2d 339 (Ariz. 1986) (interpreting a state statute and holding that municipal zoning 
regulations must be consistent—in harmony—with adopted comprehensive plans); Fasno 
v. Bd. of County Comm’rs, 507 P.2d 23 (Or. 1973) (holding that all zoning changes must 
be consistent with the comprehensive plan). 
152 See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 40A, § 6 (2006). Efforts to revise the zoning act have been 
underway for years without success. The drafters have been unwilling to integrate the zon-
ing act and the comprehensive permit statute as one. Rather, the drafters have chosen to 
propose revisions to the zoning act solely, leaving the comprehensive permit statute un-
touched. What good is a reformed zoning act when a developer has at its disposal a blank 
check in the form of a comprehensive permit? When would a developer ever file for ap-
proval pursuant to zoning? Add to the feeding trough set by the current comprehensive 
permit statute the right to build commercial uses within the project—as proposed by 
DHCD. See 760 Mass. Code Regs. 56.02 (2008). One wonders whether the legislature 
should simply abolish the zoning act in toto. If chapter 40B is not repealed, the zoning act 
will be simply surplusage and courses in Massachusetts land use law can be shortened from 
a full semester to one day. 
153 See A Local & Reg’l Monitor v. City of L.A., 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 228, 239 (Cal. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1993) (holding that where a land-use regulation is consistent with a municipally 
adopted comprehensive plan, the regulation can be reversed by a reviewing court only if it 
is based on evidence from which no reasonable person could have reached the same con-
clusion); see also Curtin & Witten, supra note 15, at 332–33. 
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mandatory planning requirements run the risk of their zoning ordi-
nances and bylaws being declared void ab initio.154 
Conclusion 
 State attempts to impose land-use decisions on local government 
are the antithesis of the well-accepted principle of home rule. While 
there is little question that states have the authority and responsibility 
to impose their preemptory authority on occasion, ill-advised imposi-
tion of such authority has measurable drawbacks. 
 As discussed in this Article, the Massachusetts Anti-Snob Zoning 
Act provides a good, if not sad, example of a statute that has simply 
gone too far in asserting compliance with a state mandate through a 
hopelessly flawed and corrupt process. The repercussions of this ill-
advised, regressive, and illogical statute are far reaching, as the very pol-
icy issue the statute portends to address has become the victim of its 
goals. Affordable housing will not be constructed in Massachusetts in 
any meaningful way while this transparent mockery of due process re-
mains law. 
 Only the driver of the statutory bus, the Massachusetts DHCD, 
and its agents155 profiting from the anarchy that defines the statute, 
appear to be continuing to ignore what havoc the statute has wrought 
upon cities and towns and the production of affordable housing. Un-
willing to engage in any form of self-reflection, unable to admit fail-
ure, and most regrettably, incapable of observing the successes in 
other states in the production of affordable housing, the Common-
wealth holds onto a statute now thirty-eight years old and written by 
                                                                                                                      
154 See Res. Def. Fund v. County of Santa Cruz, 184 Cal. Rptr. 371, 374 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1982) (“Since consistency with the general plan is required, absence of a valid general 
plan, or valid relevant elements or components thereof, precludes any enactment of zon-
ing ordinances and the like.”). 
155 In a remarkable attempt to portray 40B developers as victims of abutters seeking to 
protect themselves against the unregulated ravages of comprehensive permit projects, the 
CHAPA published a recent report relying on a “proprietary database” discussing the efforts 
of “[a] small number of attorneys [that] have represented a significant fraction of the abut-
ters and municipal entities who have appealed local and [Housing Appeals Committee] zon-
ing approvals.” Citizens’ Hous. & Planning Assoc., Zoning Litigation and Affordable 
Housing Production in Massachusetts 1, 3 (2008), available at http://www.chapa.org/ 
pdf/CHAPAZoningAppealsandAffordableHousingReportFinal.pdf. CHAPA’s report suggests 
that the delay in construction of several of the eighty-four projects identified in the re-
port’s sample is the result of abutter challenges, as opposed to, for example, the collapse 
of the housing market, investigations by the Inspector General, unsupportable land pur-
chase prices, or the impact legal fees charged by the developers’ counsel have on devel-
oper profits. See id. at 2. 
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urban legislators as payback to Boston’s suburbs for supporting school 
integration in the 1960s. 
 As with most bad laws, the Anti-Snob Zoning Act will soon be re-
membered as a sad chapter in Massachusetts’s byzantine and sometime 
corrupted politics.156 An enlightened legislature should replace the 
statute with the tools and techniques so successfully used elsewhere— 
mandatory comprehensive planning coupled with progressive regula-
tory and creative nonregulatory tools. 
 Rather than cities and towns fighting developers and their plans for 
development, development consistent with articulated and adopted 
plans will be welcome. Rather than developers destroying articulated 
and adopted plans with ill-advised developments of unlimited density— 
and lining their pockets at the expense of municipal residents— devel-
opers will become part of the solution, not just another obstacle in the 
production of affordable housing. 
                                                                                                                      
156 “A significant four-year study of organized crime in Massachusetts was undertaken 
by a special crime commission authorized by the legislature and concluded in 1957. The 
1957 report categorized conditions as the existence in society of a widespread state of law-
lessness” Dwight S. Strong, New England: The Refined Yankee in Organized Crime, 347 Annals 
Am. Acad. Pol. & Soc. Sci. 40, 46 (1963) (citing Commonwealth of Mass., Report of 
the Special Commission Revived and Continued for the Purpose of Investigating 
Organized Crime and Other Related Matters, S. 799, at 114 (1957)). “Some public 
officials and business concerns devise unscrupulous ways to seek personal gain. There is a 
lack of public morality. Corruption grows.” Id. at 50. 
